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ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE FINANCE 
by 
QIJIAN WANG 
Adviser: Professor Jun Wang 
This dissertation consists of three chapters that span earnings management, innovation, and 
insider trading. 
Chapter 1: Prior literature finds that earnings management is negatively correlated with 
institutional ownership. The question is whether institutional investors drive down earnings 
management of the firms they invest in, or they choose firms with lower earnings management. 
In this paper, I use the regression discontinuity design around Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes 
reconstruction to obtain an exogenous variation in institutional ownership. I find that 
institutional investors do not drive down earnings management after they become shareholders. 
Instead, institutions choose firms with lower earnings management level when they make 
investment decisions. To further support the preference hypothesis, I add measures of 
institution preference in the panel regression and find that the negative relation between 
institutional ownership and earnings management disappears. 
Chapter 2 (joint with Yang Liu and Jun Wang): We study the effects of passive institutional 
investors on corporate innovation. The existing literature has shown a negative relation 
between the two, and in some cases, no relation. When we apply the regression discontinuity 
design around the Russell 1000/2000 indices reconstruction to come up with an exogenous 
variation of passive institutional investors, we find that more passive institutional investors 
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bring more corporate innovations. In addition to the evidence that passive institutional investors 
bring better corporate governance practices, we show two more channels. Passive institutional 
investors reduce the overall CEO turnover probability and they are more discriminating in 
linking CEO turnover to relative performance. Passive institutional investors are associated 
with wide adoption of employee stock options and employee stock options foster innovation. 
Chapter 3: This essay studies the effect of institutional investors on insider trading. By 
applying the regression discontinuity design around the Russell 1000/2000 indices 
reconstruction to come up with an exogenous variation of institutional ownership, I find that 
institutional investors reduce insider trading: both the frequency of insider transactions and the 
total volumes traded. This effect is stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry and 
lower price impact concerns, showing that institutional investors play as the monitoring role in 
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Influence or preference? A new look at institutional ownership and earnings 
management 
Many major corporations still play things straight, but a significant and growing number 
of otherwise high-grade managers—CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses for your 
children or as trustees under your will—have come to the view that it’s OK to manipulate 
earnings to satisfy what they believe are Wall Street’s desires.  
                                                  --Warren Buffett 
Managers tend to report earnings towards some desired level of profit. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) document a discontinuity around zero earnings with a 
disproportionately low frequency of values just below zero, and a high frequency of values just 
above zero. Similarly, Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2003) and Phillips, Pincus, and Rego 
(2003) find that companies rely on non-accounting estimates (also known as accruals) to avoid 
losses. In addition, managers not only manipulate earnings through accruals, but also through 
real activities. Roychowdhury (2006) finds that firms also use operational activities to avoid 
losses. His findings indicate that firms offer price discounts, temporarily increase their 
production to report lower cost of goods sold and reduce discretionary expenditures like R&D 
and Selling, General, and Administrative expenses to improve margins which reduce the 
chances of a loss. From this prior literature, we can see that earnings management is quite a 
common phenomenon.  
The underlying incentive for managers to manipulate earnings is mainly for security 
issuance (Ducharme et al. 2001), CEO compensation (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006), 
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lending contracts (Defond and Jiambalvo 1994), and job safety (Ronen and Sadan 1981): to 
keep the position and avoid interference (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995). However, the cost of 
earnings management is quite high. Manipulating earnings around IPO and SEO will lead to 
negative short-term and long-term returns after the issuance (Teoh et al. 1998; Teoh et al. 1998; 
Rangan 1998). In addition, firms with higher earnings management are not only more likely to 
deviate from the optimal investment level (Kedia and Philippon 2009; Biddle et al. 2009; 
Mcnichols and Stubben 2008) but are also more likely to be involved in lawsuits (Ducharme 
et al. 2004; Gong et al. 2008). What’s more, managers also extract wealth from shareholders 
by using earnings manipulation: managers with higher equity holdings are more likely to use 
earnings management to increase the value of shares to be sold (Cheng and Warfield 2005). 
Therefore, preventing or mitigating earnings manipulation is an important task for shareholders, 
investors, and society.   
From prior literature, it is clear that institutional investors can exert influence on firm 
governance, either through their voice, which is a direct intervention (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; 
Huddart 1993), or through the threat to exit which is an indirect intervention (Admita and 
Pfleiderer 2009; Edmans 2011; Edmans and Manso 2011). In a direct intervention, institutions 
can influence firm governance and operations by using their voting rights so that they can 
directly impact a firm’s operation. In an indirect intervention, institutions can sell their holdings 
if the firm does not perform well, thus exerting a threat to exit and pushing managers to perform 
in a good manner. Based on these monitoring hypotheses, Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) 
show that managerial ownership is negatively correlated to the magnitude of accounting 
accrual adjustments. In addition, Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) find that the presence of large 
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institutional shareholdings inhibits managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits 
towards their desired level or range of profit. Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008) also find 
that earnings management is lower when there is more monitoring of management discretion 
from sources such as institutional ownership of shares, institutional representation on the board, 
and independent outside directors on the board. All previous literature finds that there is a 
negative correlation between earnings management and institutional holdings. However, there 
are two possible underlying mechanisms for this negative relation between institutional 
ownership and earnings management: either (1) institutions drive down earnings management 
through the monitoring effect after they become shareholders, or (2) institutions prefer firms 
with lower earnings management when they make investment decisions. Both hypotheses can 
lead to a negative relation between institutional ownership and earnings management, but prior 
literature fails to disentangle which channel it is since it is difficult to show that institutions 
drive earnings management because institutions may simultaneously choose stocks based on 
earnings management. In this paper, by applying Russell Index rebalance design, in which there 
is an exogenous variation in institutional ownership for comparable firms, I find that higher 
institutional holding does not lead to lower earnings management; instead, it is institutions’ 
preferences that drive the negative correlation. After I add institutional investor preference 
measures, the negative effect disappears. In addition, I find that after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
in 2002, in which there is an improvement in accounting quality, the negative relation between 
earnings management and institutional holdings is mitigated. What’s more, I also use firms that 
just beat the forecast EPS as an instrument for earnings management and find that institutional 
investors will pull back their holdings for firms with higher earnings management within a two-
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year period. These results confirm that it is institutions’ preferences, not their monitoring effect, 
that leads to the negative relation between earnings management and institutional ownership.  
At the end of May each year, Russell Investments ranks all U.S. firms based on their market 
capitalization; then, the first one thousand firms are included in the Russell 1000, while the 
next two thousand firms fall in the Russell 2000. Firms around the 1000th rank have very close 
market capitalization; however, because of their market capitalization ranks on the last trading 
day in May, they fall into different indexes. Since the Russell index is value weighted, the top 
firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher weights than the bottom firms in the Russell 1000. 
In addition, while the Russell 1000 total market cap is more than 10 times larger than the 
Russell 2000 total market cap, the total dollar amount which includes both passive and active 
investors for the Russell 1000 is about half compared to the total dollar amount benchmarked 
to the Russell 2000. Therefore, the top firms in the Russell 2000 receive a greater dollar amount 
compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 1000 (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich 2015). Since 
firms cannot control small variations in market cap, index assignment near the threshold is as 
good as random. This random assignment leads to a big difference in index weights around the 
threshold, and the sharp difference in index weights around the cutoff point drives an 
exogenous variation in institutional ownership. By applying this index reconstruction setting, 
I can test the causality between institutional holdings and earnings management.  
First, I run the panel regression to replicate prior literature in which there is a negative 
relation between institutional ownership and earnings management, showing that my findings 
are not due to the data specialty in my sample. Next, after applying the Russell index regression 
discontinuity design in which there is an exogenous variation in institutional holdings, I find 
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that there is no causal relation between institutional holding and earnings management, 
indicating that the increase in institutional holdings does not drive down earnings management. 
Then, I test whether it is institutions’ preferences that leads to the negative correlation. I 
developed two measures for institutional preference on firms’ earnings management; after 
adding those preference measures into the baseline regression, the negative effect between 
institutional holding and earnings management disappears, confirming that in the baseline 
regression, the negative relation indeed captures institutions’ preferences rather than a causal 
relation. In addition, I also find that higher earnings management leads to lower institutional 
holdings; this effect is mitigated after the SOX Act when there is an improvement in accounting 
quality. This result shows that better accounting quality mitigates institutional investors’ 
concern over earnings management and leads to higher institutional holdings, which is 
consistent with the preference hypothesis. I further use firms that just beat forecast EPS as an 
instrument for earnings management and find that institutional holding significantly decreases 
in the next two years for firms with higher earnings management, which means that institutional 
investors withdraw their money from firms with higher earnings management. Finally, in the 
robustness test, the results show that higher earnings management firms inhibit institutional 
holdings, supporting the idea that institutions take earnings management into account when 
they make investment decisions. 
There is current literature that focuses on the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff to analyze the price 
effect of addition and deletion from the Russell index (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich 2015), the 
association between institutional holding and payout policy (Crane, Michenaud, and Weston 
2016), CEO compensation (Mullins 2015), management disclosure (Boone and White 2015), 
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acquisition and CEO power (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2016), monitoring incentives (Fich, 
Harford,and Tran 2015), and passive investor effect on firm governance (Appel, Gormley, and 
Keim 2016; Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2017). According to my best knowledge, this is the 
first paper that applies the regression discontinuity setting to disentangle the causal relation 
between institutional holding and earnings management, thus offering a potential mechanism 
to explain the negative relation between institutional holding and earnings management.   
 
1. Data and Russell index background  
1.1 Sample  
The sample includes firms in the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 from years 1995 to 2015. I 
obtain the index constitution data from Bloomberg, then merge it with firm-level accounting 
data from Compustat, institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters 13F filing, analyst 
forecast data from I/B/E/S, and security market data from CRSP. The institutional investor 
types are from Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001). 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for firms in the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000, and 
it shows the variables’ mean, standard deviation, 25 percentile value, median, and 75 percentile 
value. We can see that institutional investors account for 67% of firms’ total shares outstanding. 
Based on Bushee and Noe’s investor classifications, institutional investors can be separated 
based on investment horizon and portfolio diversification, and divided into dedicated investors 
(long horizon, concentrated portfolio), quasi-indexers (long horizon, diversified portfolio), and 
transient investors (short horizon and diversified portfolio). Most institutional holdings belong 
to quasi-indexers, which account for 42% of firm total shares outstanding. Transient investor 
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investment is around 17%, while dedicated investor holding is around 9%.  
Discretional accruals DA measure how much the accruals are deviating from the optimal 
level. Since both positive and negative deviation are earnings manipulation, I take the absolute 
value of discretional accruals--|DA| as the measure for earnings management. Other variables 
are used as controls for firm characteristics. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total 
assets. We can see the average firm size is around 7. MB is market to book value. If a firm has 
a comparatively higher market-to-book value, it means investors have a good prospect about 
the firm’s future development. ROA is return on assets. Return on assets measures how much 
profit a firm can gain for one dollar of assets. The average ROA for the sample is around 12%. 
Leverage measures firm debt-equity structure. It measures the capital structure for firm 
financing decisions. If the value is high, it means more financing from debt; if the value is low, 
if means more financing from equity. Firm characteristics variables are described in detail in 
the Appendix.   
  
1.2 Russell index background  
During the June of each year, FTSE Russell ranks all firms based on their market caps on the 
last trading day in May. As Figure 1 shows, the first 1000 constitute the Russell 1000 index and 
the subsequent 2000 firms go to the Russell 2000. At the end of June, Russell Investments 
publishes the new index list, and the financial market will follow the new list from the next 
trading day until June of the following year. The market cap is calculated by multiplying closing 
price on the last trading day in May and the total common shares outstanding. When there are 
more than two classes of shares, Russell will use the share price of the class with the largest 
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number of float shares.  
   For firms around the 1000th rank, there is a fundamental reason to expect a sharp change 
in institutional ownership. As Figure 1 shows, firms around the threshold have comparable 
market caps; since firms cannot control small variations in market capitalization on a 
determined day, the assignment to different indexes is as good as random. The Russell Index is 
value weighted, so firms at the top of the Russell 2000 receive much more weights than firms 
at the bottom of the Russell 1000. Figure 2 plots the index weight and the market cap rank for 
firms in Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 around 500 bandwidths from the cutoff point. We can 
see top firms in the Russell 2000 (rank from 0 to 500) have much higher weights compared to 
the bottom firms in the Russell 1000 (rank from -500 to 0). Closer to the cutoff points, the 
difference becomes even larger.  
The Russell indexes attract a large amount of investments. According to Russell 
Investments’ 2008 U.S. Equity Indexes: Institutional Benchmark Survey, the number of 
products benchmarked to the Russell 2000 is about 2/3 compared to the number benchmarked 
to the S&P 500; the dollar amount is about 1/7 compared to that of the S&P 500; and the ratios 
are increasing over time. The Russell 1000 index firm total market cap is around 10 times that 
of the Russell 2000; however, the Russell 1000 attracts only half the total dollar amount 
compared to dollars invested in the Russell 2000 index, and there are two to three times more 
dollars passively tracking the Russell 1000 than the Russell 2000. Since the Russell Index is 
value-weighted, top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher weights than bottom firms in 
the Russell 1000. In addition, more dollars are invested in the Russell 2000, so the top firms in 
the Russell 2000 receive a greater dollar amount compared to the bottom Russell 1000 firms. 
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The institutional holding for top firms in the Russell 2000 is correspondingly much higher than 
for bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Figure 3 presents institutional holdings for firms around 
the threshold when bandwidth equals ±500. The figure indicates that there is a significant 
variation in institutional ownership for firms around the cutoff point: firms at top of the Russell 
2000 have around 10% more institutional holdings compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 
1000. Closer to the cutoff point, the difference is even larger. This evidence shows that the 
random assignment into difference indexes leads to a sharp difference in index weight and a 
subsequent exogenous change in institutional holdings.   
   Since Russell Investment uses its proprietary data to calculate the market cap, which 
cannot be exactly identified by CRSP and Compustat, I use the actual assignment instead of 
the end of May market cap as the instrument for institutional holding in order to capture the 
relationship more precisely. In addition, after 2007, Russell introduced a “banding” rule to 
maintain consistency for index constitution. Under this new rule, only if a firm’s market cap 
change is big enough, can it switch to the other index; otherwise, the firm will still stay in its 
current index, which leads to a stickiness in index membership. To be more specific, firms are 
ranked in a descending order based on their end of May market caps, and a cumulative market 
cap is calculated for each firm. Then, the cumulative market cap is divided by total market cap 
of all Russell 3000E firms to get the market cap ratio for each firm. Based on this market cap 
ratio, a firm will jump into the other index only if its market cap ratio is more than ±2.5% away 
compared to the 1000th firm’s market cap ratio. We can tell this banding rule reduces the 
turnover for index constitution. To validate the random assignment, I study the effect up to year 
2006 to test the monitoring hypothesis. However, in the tests for preference hypothesis and 
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baseline regression, I use the data from years 1995 to 2015.  
 
1.3 Measure of earnings management 
To proxy for earnings management, I use discretional accruals based on the modified Jones 
model (1991). To construct this measure, I first estimate the following cross-sectional 
regression based on first two digit SIC industry code:  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1









+ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡                (1) 
where i indicate firm and t indicates fiscal year. Total accruals (TA) are defined as earnings 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus operation cash flow for fiscal 
year t. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 is total assets at the end of year t-1, △ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 is the change in sales revenue 
from year t-1 to year t, and PPEt is the gross value of property, plant, and equipment at the end 
of year t.  
   Next, I use the coefficient estimated in equation (1) to estimate the expected normal 
accruals: 









                    (2) 
The change in accounts receivable ∆𝐴𝑅 is subtracted from the change in sales revenue as 
credit sales also provide a potential opportunity for accounting distortion (Dechow et al. 1995). 
After obtaining the expected normal accruals from equation (2), I calculate discretional 
accruals as the difference between actual accruals and the expected normal accruals. Since both 
positive and negative values indicate earnings manipulation, I take the absolute value of the 
discretional accruals and treat it as earnings management measure. So |DA| is the measure for 
earnings management (EM).   
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2. Identification and methodology 
2.1 Regression discontinuity design to test monitoring hypothesis 
To identify the causal relation between institutional ownership and earnings management, I 
implement the regression discontinuity design with the 2SLS model as follows: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡      (3)           
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡              (4)       
   The first stage regression equation (3) is based on regression discontinuity design, I use 
Russell2000, which indicates whether the firm belongs to the Russell 2000, as the instrument 
for institutional ownership. The underlying assumption is that for firms around the index 
threshold that have been assigned to the Russell 2000 instead of the Russell 1000, there is an 
exogenous variation in institutional holdings, and the assignment is not directly correlated with 
earnings management. 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) is a function based on a firm’s end of May market cap rank 
to account for the distance to index threshold. When the polynomial order equals zero the 
regress is as below: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
When the polynomial order equals one, the regression is as following: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000) + 𝛿3𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000 ∗ (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000)
+ 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛾2(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000) + 𝛾3𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000 ∗ (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000)
+ 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
When the polynomial order equals two, the regression is as following: 
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𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000) + 𝛿3𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000 ∗ (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000)
+ 𝛿4(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000)
2 + 𝛿5𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000 ∗ (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000)
2 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛾2(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000) + 𝛾3𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000 ∗ (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000)
+ 𝛾4(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000)
2 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000 ∗ (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 − 1000)
2 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
FloatAdj is the proxy for Russell index float adjustment, computed as the difference between 
end of May market cap rank and the actual rank assigned by Russell Investments in June. By 
including this variable, I also control the variation in index weight caused by Russell 
Investments’ adjustment on float shares. X stands for firm characteristics, which include size, 
market-to-book, return on assets, and leverage. The control variables are consistent with Fang, 
Huang and Karpoff (2016). 
   In the second stage regression equation (4), I use the instrumented IO obtained from the 
first stage to test the causal effect on earnings management. The earnings management measure 
is from current year July to next year June, since it may take time for institutions to exert their 
influence, as well as to mitigate the rebalance issue in the subsequent year. I also control for 
firm characteristics, Rank*, and FloatAdj, just as with the first stage’s controls. Both stages 
include year and industry fixed effect, also clustered by firm. Coefficients are scaled by variable 
standard deviation. Therefore, the magnitude indicates the standard deviation change in the 
dependent variable when there is a standard deviation change in the corresponding independent 
variable. By standardizing the coefficient, we can compare economic importance for different 
regressions more conveniently.  
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2.2 Tests for preference hypothesis 
To test the preference hypothesis, I develop two measures for institutions’ preferences on 
earnings management. The first measure is a direct measure: whether a firm’s earnings 
management level is below the industry median in given year. If it is, I generate dummy equals 
one; if it is above the industry median, then the dummy equals zero. So, dummy equals one 
indicates a firm with a lower earnings management level in a given year. 
In addition, I develop another way to measure institutions’ preferences based on Kempf, 
Manconi, and Spalt (2017). Kempf et al. developed a methodology to measure firm level 
shareholder distraction. I apply the similar method to measure firm-level institutional 
preference for earnings management. Institutions have investments in many firms, and each 
firm has many institutional holdings. I developed the measure in two steps. In the first step, for 
each institution, I calculate the dollar-weighted average of the earnings management level of 
the firms in its holdings:  










                                 (5) 
where 𝐸𝑀𝑡
𝑓
 refers to firm f’s earnings management level in year t. 𝐹𝑗,𝑡 is the set of all stocks 
held by institution j at year t and $𝑗,𝑡
𝑓
 is the dollar amount of institution j’s funding allocated 
to stocks of firm f. Based on this calculation, I have a measure of institution-level earnings 
management preferences.  
Then, to get the firm level institutional investor preference for earnings management, for 
each firm, I calculate the dollar-weighted earnings management preference for each institution 





̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑓 = ∑





𝑗 𝑠.𝑡.  𝑓∈𝐹𝑗,𝑡
𝑗 𝑠.𝑡.  𝑓∈𝐹𝑗,,𝑡
                              (6) 
where 𝐸𝑀𝑗,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the institution j’s preference on earnings management in year t as defined in 
equation (5). This firm-level aggregate preference is referred to as institutional preference for 
earnings management level.  
 After replicating prior literature and demonstrating the relationship between institutional 
holdings and earnings management, I add those two preference measures into the baseline 
regression to see whether the negative effect still exists. If it is still significant, then institutions’ 
preferences may not play an important role. However, if the relationship between institutional 
investors and the earnings management coefficient is no longer significant, then it indicates 
that prior findings of a negative effect capture institutions’ preferences, not their monitoring 
role.  
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1 Baseline regression  
To test whether the Russell sample is ordinary and comparable to other studies, I first run the 
panel regression to test the relation between earnings management and institutional holdings, 
based on what prior literature did. I regress earnings management on institutional ownership 
and other firm characteristics, in addition to year and firm fixed effect. Table 2 reports the panel 
regression results. Column 1 is results for the full sample which is from 1995 to 2015. Column 
2 is the subsample from 1995 to 2006, consistent with the regression discontinuity design. The 
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result shows that there is a significant negative relation between earnings management and 
institutional ownership, for both the whole sample, and for the subsample, which is consistent 
with prior studies. These results indicate that the Russell sample is comparable to prior 
literature data samples, so I can apply the regression discontinuity method to test the causal 
relationship without concern for the data specialty. 
  
3.2 Results for monitoring hypothesis 
As the sharp difference in index weight leads to an exogenous variation in institutional 
ownership around the Russell 1000/2000 index cutoff point, I try to identify whether the 
increase in institutional ownership can lead to a change in earnings management.  
Before running the IV regression, I need to make sure firms around the index threshold are 
comparable under the regression discontinuity design. Table 3 shows firm characteristics for 
firms in the Russell 1000 and in the Russell 2000 when the bandwidth is ±500. We can see that 
there is a difference in market cap since the assignment is based on firm market cap. However, 
for other firm characteristics such as market to book, return on assets, leverage, and annual 
return, firms around the threshold but in different indexes are comparable, and none of the p 
values are significant for those firm characteristics. Because firm characteristics are 
comparable for firms around the threshold, I can apply the regression discontinuity design to 
test the causal effect.  
Table 4 shows the 2SLS regression results based on the regression discontinuity design. I 
run the 2SLS regression as described in equations (3) and (4). The first two columns are when 
the polynomial order is zero, the next two columns are when the polynomial order equals one, 
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and the last two columns are when the polynomial order is two. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are for 
bandwidth equals ±500, and columns 2, 4 and 6 are for bandwidth equals ±300 The first stage 
uses a firm’s membership (or lack of membership) in the Russell 2000, along with other control 
variables described in equation (3), to predict institutional holding. We can see that there is a 
significant positive relation between inclusion in the Russell 2000 and institutional ownership, 
which indicates that firms that belong to the Russell 2000 have higher institutional holdings. 
Therefore, whether or not firms are in the Russell 2000 index is a good instrument to predict 
institutional ownership. The magnitude for bandwidth ±300 is much higher than that for 
bandwidth ±500, which shows that as firms’ rankings are closer to the threshold, the 
institutional ownership difference between top firms in the Russell 2000 and bottom firms in 
the Russell 1000 is even larger: the index weight difference becomes even larger. This is 
consistent with what Figure 3 shows.  
In the second stage, I use the predicted IO which is obtained from the first stage to test the 
causal effect on earnings management. We can see that none of the coefficients for predicted 
IO are significant, which means that the increase in IO does not have any effect on earnings 
management. I also try higher order polynomials and longer periods after the index rebalance 
and still get same results. Whether a firm belongs to the Russell 2000 is a valid instrument for 
IO as is indicated in first stage, and the second stage regression results indicate that as IO 
increases, there is no impact on firm earnings management. The evidence shows us that the 
increase in institutional ownership does not affect earnings management: there is no causal 
relation. Therefore, the negative relation between institutional holding and earnings 
management found in prior literature is not rooted in the institution monitoring hypothesis.  
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For contemporaneous studies about Russell index reconstruction setting, there are different 
methodologies to deal with the regression discontinuity design. For example, Appel, Gormley, 
and Keim (2016) use market cap instead of rank in the 2SLS regression; Fich, Harford, and 
Tran (2015), and Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) use firm jumps into the other index as the 
first stage instrument. I also apply their methodologies, and the different methodologies do not 
affect my results. Thus, the finding is robust to different model specifications.  
 
3.3 Results for preference hypothesis 
From the panel regression results in Table 2, we can see that there is a negative correlation 
between institutional ownership and earnings management. There are two possible channels to 
explain this negative relationship. The first one is through institutional investors’ monitoring 
roles on earnings management, such that after institutional investors become shareholders of a 
firm, they drive down earnings management. The second explanation is that institutional 
investors endogenously choose firms with lower earnings management when they make 
investment decisions. From Table 4 we can see, based on the regression discontinuity design, 
that institutions do not affect firm earnings management through their monitoring roles. In this 
part, I test the other channel: whether institutions prefer firms with lower earnings management 
when they make their investment decisions. 
 
3.3.1 Preference measure 
I first developed two measures for institutions’ preferences on firm earnings management, then 
add those two preference measures into the baseline regression to test whether the negative 
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relation between institutional holdings and earnings management still holds. If the magnitude 
is still significant, it means institutions’ preferences may not play an important role. If the 
magnitude becomes insignificant, it suggests that the prior negative correlation captures 
institutional investor’s preference, not the monitoring effect.  
Table 5 shows the results after adding preference measures. L.Indmedian indicates whether 
a firm’s last year earnings management level is below the industry median. L.preference is last 
year firm-level aggregate institutional preference following Kempf et al. (2017). I use last year 
preference since institutions make investment decisions before they become shareholders, so it 
should be based on their prior year preference and the firm’s past year earnings management 
level. The first column is the baseline regression from which we can see a negative correlation 
between institutional ownership and firm earnings management. The next two columns add in 
preference measures: column 2 adds L.Indmedian which indicates whether a firm’s last year 
earnings management is below the industry median; column 3 adds L.Prefernce which is firm-
level institution aggregate preference following Kempf et al. (2017). We can find that after 
adding in preference measures, the significance of institutional ownership disappears, and the 
magnitude becomes close to zero. So, the baseline negative correlation between institutional 
holdings and earnings management essentially captures institutions’ preferences, not the 
monitoring effect. Those results indicate that it is not institution’s monitoring effect that 
influences firm earnings management level; instead, institutions choose firms with lower 




3.3.2 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
To further test the preference hypothesis, which indicates that institutions invest in firms with 
lower earnings management, I apply the SOX Act as an additional instrument. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is an act passed by U.S. Congress in 2002 to protect investors from 
the possibility of fraudulent accounting activities by corporations. The SOX Act mandated 
strict reforms to improve financial disclosures from corporations and to prevent accounting 
fraud. Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) document that accrual-based earnings management 
increased steadily from 1987 until the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, 
followed by a significant decline after the passage of SOX. Therefore, if earnings management 
is a serious issue for institutional investors, investors’ concern should be mitigated after the 
SOX Act since SOX is a substitution for fewer earnings accruals based on empirical findings. 
I first run earnings management on next period institutional holding to see the effects of 
earnings management on institutional holding. Then, I add SOX and the interaction term 
between SOX and earnings management into the regression. If the preference hypothesis is 
true, then lower earnings management should lead to higher institutional holdings. After the 
SOX Act, in which there is an exogenous improvement in accounting quality, the negative 
correlation between earnings management and next period institutional holdings should be 
mitigated, which means that the interaction term between SOX and earnings management 
should be positive after the SOX Act.  
Table 6 shows the results between earnings management and next period institutional 
holdings. From column 1, we can see that earnings management has a negative effect on next 
period institutional holdings, which indicates that higher earnings management inhibits 
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institutional holdings. After adding SOX and the interaction term between SOX and earnings 
management, column 2 shows that earnings management still inhibits institutional holdings; 
however, the interaction term is positive, which means that the negative effect is mitigated after 
the SOX Act. From this evidence, we can see that the improvement in accounting quality can 
mitigate invertors’ concern and attract more institutional holdings, which further supports the 
preference hypothesis.  
  
3.3.3 Applying beat EPS as the instrument of earnings management 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) document a discontinuity 
around zero earnings with a disproportionately low frequency of values just below zero, and a 
disproportionately high frequency of values just above zero. Burgstahler and Eames (2006) 
find that firms manipulate earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts. Bennett, Bettis, Gopalan, and 
Milbourn (2017) also find that a disproportionately large number of firms exceed their goals 
by a small margin as compared to the number that fall short of the goal by a similar margin. 
Figure 4 confirms their argument. The figure plots the frequency with which firms exceed their 
goals, and to what extent the firms beat analysts’ EPS forecasts (EPS surplus). I take the 
difference between actual earnings per share (EPS) and the median of analysts’ forecasts to 
measure EPS surplus. If it is a positive number, it means the firm outperforms analysts’ 
forecasts; if it is a negative number, it means the firm underperforms analysts’ forecasts. If 
firms use accruals in a similar manner, we should find that the frequency with which firms just 
beat EPS forecasts is close to the frequency with which firms just fall short of forecasts. 
However, from Figure 4, we find that there is much higher frequency of firms that just beat 
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analysts’ forecasts compared to firms just fall short. Therefore, there is a fundamental reason 
to expect that firms that just beat EPS use more earnings management compared to firms that 
just fall short of forecasts. I apply whether the firm beats analysts’ forecasts as the instrument 
for earnings management and test when there is a change in earnings management, and what 
the impact is on future institutional holdings. To be more specific, I apply the 2SLS as follows: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜆0𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡        (7) 
𝛥𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜑1𝐸𝑀𝑖?̂? + 𝜑2𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜍𝑖𝑡          (8) 
where Beat EPS is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm’s actual EPS beats analysts’ 
forecasts. I calculate the difference between actual EPS and the median of analyst forecast EPS. 
If the difference is equal to or bigger than zero, the dummy equals one; otherwise, the dummy 
equals zero. Then, I rank all firms based on how much they beat or fall short of analysts’ 
forecasts within beat EPS (or fall short of EPS), to capture the distance to the beat EPS 
threshold. The interaction term between Beat EPS and rank captures the shape of regression 
for firms that beat EPS and fail EPS. X is the control variable for firm characteristics which 
include size, market-to-book, return on assets, and leverage. In the second stage, I use the 
predicted earnings management to test when there is a change in earnings management level, 
what is the effect on institutional holdings. I also add interaction term and control variables, 
the same as in the first stage. For dependent variable--the change in institutional holdings, I use 
forward one year minus current year institutional holdings, and forward two years minus 
current year institutional holdings, since it may take a while for the change to take effect.  
 Table 7 shows the results of instrumented earnings management effect on institutional 
holdings. Columns 1 and 2 are where the dependent variable is forward one-year institutional 
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holdings minus current year holdings. Columns 3 and 4 are where the dependent variable is 
forward two-year holdings minus current year holdings. In addition, columns 1 and 3 are for 
firms whose actual EPS minus analyst forecast EPS are within ±2 cents, and columns 2 and 4 
are for firms whose actual EPS minus analyst forecast EPS are within ±5 cents. From the first 
stage results we can see that whether the firm just beat EPS has a positive and significant 
relation with earnings management: firms that just beat the forecast EPS have higher earnings 
management levels compared to firms that just fall short of the forecast EPS.  
Then, in the second stage, I use the predicted earnings management to test its effect on 
institutional holdings. From the results in the second stage, we can see that predicted earnings 
management doesn’t have any effect on forward one-year institutional holding change: the 
magnitude is negative, but it’s not statistically significant. However, for columns 3 and 4 where 
the dependent variable is forward 2-year institutional holding minus current year institutional 
holding, we can see that there is a significant decrease in the holding change. As the sample 
size is closer to just beating the forecast EPS, the effect is even stronger. So, we can see that 
when there is an exogenous increase in earnings management, institutional holdings do not 
decrease simultaneously; instead, institutional investors pull back their investments in the 
following year. A possible underlying reason is that at the time that the firm just beats the 
forecast EPS, it is good news, and institutions cannot directly tell whether it is because of 
earnings manipulation, so institutional investors still hold their shares. However, as time goes 
by, institutional investors realize that the firm beats EPS by manipulating earnings, so they pull 
back their holdings later.  
This evidence further supports the finding that institutional investors prefer firms with 
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lower earning management. When the firms exogenously increase their earnings management, 
institutions will reduce their holdings in those firms.  
 
4. Robustness test 
The results in regression discontinuity design and the preference hypothesis test show that 
institutional investors do not drive down earnings management through their monitoring roles; 
instead, they choose firms with lower earnings management levels. In this section, I try to 
explore whether firms with lower earnings management attract more institutional holdings in 
each year.  
I explore the institutional ownership for firms with different levels of earnings management. 
Firms are divided into deciles based on their earnings management level in each year; then, I 
calculate the average level of institutional holdings in each decile. 
Table 8 shows the institutional holding within each group. We can see that for firms with 
the lowest level of earnings management, institutional holding is around 66.1%. For firms with 
the highest earnings management level, institutional holding is around 62.8%. The difference 
between these two groups is about 3.4%, and it is highly significant.  
From this additional evidence, we can see that firms with lower earnings management 
attract more institutional holdings, while firms with higher earnings management hinder 
institutional holdings. This evidence supports the preference hypothesis: institutions invest in 





Prior literature shows that there is a negative relation between institutional holdings and 
earnings management and claims that institutions play monitoring roles and thus drive down 
earnings management. However, institutions may simultaneously invest in firms with lower 
earnings management. In this paper, I try to disentangle this issue by applying a regression 
discontinuity design in which there is an exogenous variation in institutional ownership for 
comparable firms.  
In contrast to prior findings, based on the regression discontinuity design in the Russell 
index reconstitution, I find that when there is an increase in institutional holdings, institutional 
investors have no impact on firms’ earnings management, which indicates that the negative 
relationship is not caused by institutions’ monitoring roles.  
To test whether institutions choose firms with lower earnings management, I developed 
two measures to capture institutional preference on firm earnings management level. After 
adding the preference measures into the baseline regression, I find that the negative effect 
disappears, which confirms that the prior literature’s finding captures institutional preference, 
not a monitoring effect. I also use the SOX Act in which there is an improvement in accounting 
quality as an instrument to test earnings management’s effect on institutional holdings: results 
show that after the SOX Act, the negative effect of earnings management on next period 
institutional holdings is mitigated, which indicates that better accounting quality attracts more 
institutional holdings. What’s more, I apply whether a firm beats EPS as an instrument for 
earnings management and find that higher earnings management inhibits institutional holding 
in the subsequent year. Lastly, I find that firms with lower earnings management levels attract 
more institutional investments which further supports the preference hypothesis. These 
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evidence shows that it is institutions’ preferences, not their monitoring roles, that lead to the 
negative relation between institutional holding and earnings management.  
To my best knowledge, this is the first paper to disentangle the endogeneity issue between 
institutional holding and firm earnings management. The exogenous change in institutional 
holdings for Russell index reconstitution and the disproportional frequency with which firms 
beat their goals provide us with possible mechanisms to explore the causality and endogeneity 


















Figure 1 Russell index market cap  
This figure plots the relationship between firm market cap and corresponding rank based on 
the end of May market capitalization. The first 1000 firms go to the Russell 1000 and the 
subsequent 2000 firms go to the Russell 2000. The vertical line corresponds to firm market cap 
at the end of May. Rank on the horizontal line indicates the distance to index threshold. Zero 
means the 1000th rank, which is the threshold for index assignment. Negative numbers are for 







Figure 2 Russell index weight 
This figure plots the relationship between firm index weight and its market cap rank around 
the threshold. The vertical line is the index weight in percentage and the horizontal line is the 
distance to the threshold based on market cap rank. Zero means the 1000th rank, which is the 
threshold for index assignment. Negative numbers are for firms in the Russell 1000, and 









Figure 3 Russell index and institutional ownership 
This figure plots the relationship between institutional ownership and firm market cap rank 
around the threshold. The vertical line is firm institutional holding in real numbers and the 
horizontal line is the market cap rank. Rank indicates the distance to the threshold. Zero means 
the 1000th rank, which is the threshold for index assignment. Negative numbers are for firms 






Figure 4 The frequency of firms again the extent that they beat the forecast EPS 
This figure plots the frequency against the difference between the actual earnings per share and 
the analyst forecast, which is beat EPS. The horizontal line is the difference between actual 
earnings and median of analysts’ forecasts. The vertical line is the frequency of corresponding 





Table 1 Summary statistics 
This panel reports summary statistics of firm characteristics for firms belonging to the Russell 
1000 and the Russell 2000. The table shows each variable’s mean, standard deviation, 25 
percentile value, median, and 75 percentile value. Variables are defined in the Appendix. All 
variables are winsorized at 1% levels. 
 
 
 Mean Std. Dev p25 Median p75 
Total IO 0.67 0.70 0.51 0.70 0.86 
Dedicated 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.13 
Quasi indexer 0.42 0.42 0.28 0.42 0.54 
Transient 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.23 
DA -0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.12 
|DA| 0.40 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.31 
Size 7.02 6.85 5.82 6.85 8.07 
MB 3.72 2.31 1.46 2.31 3.91 
ROA 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.21 






Table 2 Panel regression based on different window size 
This table presents the panel regression that regresses earnings management on IO, firm 
characteristics, year, and firm fixed effects. Column 1 shows the regression for the full sample, 
which includes years 1995 to 2015. Column 2 shows the result for the subsample from years 
1995 to 2006. Coefficients are scaled by variable standard deviation, and reported with t 
statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, ** and* indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the two-tailed test.  
 
 Earnings management 
 (1) (2) 
 Full sample 1995-2006 
IO -0.029*** -0.032*** 
 (-2.81) (-2.64) 
Size 0.017 0.024 
 (0.89) (1.05) 
MB -0.000 0.001 
 (-0.01) (0.27) 
ROA 0.121*** 0.130*** 
 (15.93) (14.05) 
Lev 0.006 -0.000 
 (0.97) (-0.01) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 





Table 3 Firm characteristics comparison when bandwidth is 500 
This table compares firm characteristics for firms around the threshold that fall into different 
indexes. The bandwidth is 500. Russell 1000 indicates firms that belong to the Russell 1000 
and are within 500 rank distance from the index threshold (rank from -500 to 0). Russell 2000 
includes firms in the Russell 2000 that are within 500 rank distance from threshold (rank from 
0 to 500). The last column indicates the t-test’s p value, which indicates whether there is 
significant difference between these two groups.  
 
 Russell 1000 Russell 2000 P value 
Market cap 2.3 billion 936 million 0 
MB 3.03 3.29 0.517 
ROA 0.15 0.18 0.434 
Leverage 0.99 0.95 0.385 






Table 4 IV regression based on regression discontinuity design 
This table presents the instrumental variable (2SLS) estimation applying different polynomial 
orders. The first stage uses the assignment to the Russell 2000 as instrument for institutional 
ownership: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
The second stage regression uses the instrumented IO obtained from first stage to test the causal 
effect on firm earnings management: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
All results are estimated using ranks implied by firms’ end of May market capitalization within 
the assigned index as of the index assignment date. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the effect using 
polynomial order k=0 for both stages, columns 3 and 4 are for k=1, and columns 5 and 6 are 
for k=2. In addition, columns 1, 3, 5 shows the results of ±500 ranks from the threshold, and 
columns 2, 4, 6 represents over ±300 from the cutoff respectively. Both stages include year and 
industry fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by firm, scaled by variable standard 
deviation, and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 






























 K=0 K=1 K=2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ±500 ±300 ±500 ±300 ±500 ±300 
First stage Institutional Ownership 
Russell2000 0.034*** 0.061*** 0.145*** 0.193*** 0.119*** 0.154*** 
 (4.37) (7.97) (12.57) (12.41) (8.09) (8.87) 
Second stage Earnings management 
 0.057 -0.068 -0.193 -0.294 -0.323 -0.377 
 (0.38) (-0.60) (-1.04) (-1.04) (-1.08) (-1.04) 
Rank   0.134 0.361 0.460 0.906 
   (0.97) (0.99) (1.11) (1.03) 
Rank*R2000   -0.107 -0.299 -0.319 -0.798 
   (-0.90) (-0.95) (-1.08) (-1.03) 
Rank2     0.878 1.643 
     (1.10) (0.97) 
Rank2*R2000     -1.210 -1.928 
     (-1.10) (-0.96) 
FloatAdj 0.002 0.050 0.075 0.086 0.173 0.197 
 (0.05) (0.79) (0.96) (0.93) (1.05) (0.99) 
Size 0.017 0.058 0.080 0.109 0.094 0.113 
 (0.64) (0.83) (0.94) (0.90) (0.98) (0.91) 
MB 0.029 0.080 0.032 0.080 0.027 0.072 
 (0.94) (0.98) (0.90) (0.93) (0.78) (0.88) 
ROA 0.440 0.654 0.475 0.674 0.488 0.679 
 (1.04) (1.05) (1.04) (1.05) (1.04) (1.05) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 -0.0004 0.002 0.001 0.005 
 (0.23) (0.10) (-0.06) (0.19) (0.11) (0.35) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 






Table 5 Regression with preference measures 
This table shows the relationship between earnings management and institutional ownership 
after adding in institutions’ preference measures. The first column is the baseline regression, 
and next two columns add preference measures. All regressions are controlled for year and firm 
fixed effect. LIndmedian indicates whether a firm’s last year earnings management is below 
industry median. Lpreference is firm’s last year institution preference following Kempt et al. 
(2017). Coefficients are scaled by variable standard deviation, and reported with t statistics in 
parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the two-tailed test. 
 Earnings management 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IO -0.029*** -0.010 -0.010 
 (-2.81) (-0.87) (-0.87) 
L.Indmedian  0.020***  
  (3.73)  
L.Preference   0.011 
   (1.08) 
Size 0.017 0.005 0.012 
 (0.89) (0.25) (0.58) 
MB -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.01) (-0.32) (-0.20) 
ROA 0.121*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 
 (15.93) (10.32) (9.61) 
Lev 0.006 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.97) (3.50) (3.34) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 



















Table 6 Earnings management influence on institutional ownership 
This table presents earnings management’s impact on next period institutional ownership. 
Column 1 shows the earnings management effect on next period institutional holdings. Column 
2 adds SOX, and the interaction term between SOX and earnings management. SOX is a 
dummy that indicates whether it is after year 2002. Coefficients are scaled by variable standard 
deviation, and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the two-tailed test. 
 
 Next period institutional holdings 
 (1) (2) 
EM -0.010*** -0.169*** 
 (-3.81) (-4.34) 
EM*SOX  0.159*** 
  (4.09) 
SOX  0.089*** 
  (11.10) 
Size 0.173*** 0.173*** 
 (18.64) (18.68) 
MB 0.005* 0.005* 
 (1.90) (1.92) 
ROA 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (8.97) (8.85) 
Lev -0.007** -0.007** 
 (-2.20) (-2.18) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 




















Table 7 2SLS regression of earnings management effect on institutional holdings 
This table presents the instrumental variable (2SLS) estimation of earnings management effect 
on institutional holding. The first stage uses whether or not a firm beats the earnings forecast 
as an instrument for earnings management: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜆0𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 
The second stage regression use the instrumented IO obtained from first stage to test the causal 
effect on firm earnings management: 
𝛥𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜑1𝐸𝑀𝑖?̂? + 𝜑2𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜍𝑖𝑡 
Columns 1 and 3 are for firms that beat EPS within ±2 cents, and columns 2 and 4 are for firms 
that beat EPS within ±5 cents. In addition, the dependent variable for columns 1 and 2 is next 
period IO minus current year IO, and for columns 3 and 4, it is year two IO minus current year 
IO. Both stages include industry fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by firm, scaled by 
variable standard deviation, and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined 
in the Appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the 
two-tailed test.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ±2 cents ±5 cents ±2 cents ±5 cents 
First stage Earnings management 
Beat EPS 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (3.13) (2.88) (3.25) (2.91) 
Second stage  f.IO-IO f2.IO-IO 
𝐸?̂? -0.149 -0.031 -0.998** -0.765* 
 (-0.41) (-0.08) (-2.25) (-1.78) 
Rank* Beat EPS 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.015 
 (2.96) (3.18) (2.91) (1.64) 
f. EPS surplus   0.088*** 0.086*** 
   (6.27) (7.06) 
Size -0.085*** -0.077*** -0.146*** -0.141*** 
 (-10.06) (-10.94) (-10.71) (-13.20) 
MB -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.002 
 (-0.15) (-0.53) (-0.99) (-0.18) 
ROA 0.008 0.019* -0.038 -0.017 
 (0.64) (1.91) (-1.01) (-0.71) 
Lev 0.005 -0.003 0.019 0.013 
 (0.47) (-0.29) (1.08) (0.88) 
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  




Table 8 Institutional ownership based on earnings management deciles 
This table show institutional ownership based on firms with different levels of earnings 
management. Firms are divided into deciles. Lowest indicates firms with the lowest earnings 
management level, while highest indicates firms with the highest level of earnings management. 
Mean (IO) is the average level of institutional ownership in each decile. The last row (10-1) 
shows institutional ownership difference between firms with the highest and lowest levels of 





















A firm’s discretionary accruals are defined as the difference between 
its total accruals and the fitted normal accruals derived from the 
modified Jones model (Jones (1991)). The modified Jones model 
follows Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and is specified as 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1









+ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 , Total 
accruals TAi,t are defined as earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (IBC) minus operating cash flows 
(OANCF−XIDOC), ASSETi,t-1 is total assets at the beginning of year 
t (AT), ΔREVi,t is the change in sales revenue (SALE) from the 
preceding year, and PPEi,t is gross property, plant, and equipment 










 , with the change in 
accounts receivable (RECT) subtracted from the change in sales 
revenue. Firm-year-specific discretionary accruals are calculated as 
DAi,t = (TAi,t / ASSETi,t-1) – NAi,t. 
ASSETt Book value of total assets (AT) at the end of fiscal year t; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of ASSET. 
MBt Market-to-book ratio in fiscal year t, calculated as the market value of 
equity (PRCC_F×CSHO) divided by the book value of equity (CEQ) 
at the end of the year. 
ROAt Return on assets in fiscal year t, calculated as income before 
depreciation and amortization (OIBDP) during year t scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the year. 
Levt Leverage in fiscal year t, calculated as long-term debt (DLTT) plus 
debt in current liabilities (DLC) scaled by the sum of long-term debt, 
debt in current liabilities, and total shareholders’ equity (SEQ) at the 
end of the year. 
IO Institutional ownership obtained from 13f 
Dedicated  The proportion of dedicated institutional investor based on Bushee 
classification.  
Quasi-indexer The proportion of quasi-indexer institutional investor based on Bushee 
classification. 
Transient The proportion of transient institutional investor based on Bushee 
classification. 
Russell2000   
(R2000) 
 
A dummy indicates whether firm belongs to the Russell 2000. If the 
firm is in Russell 2000, the dummy equals one; if the firm is in Russell 
1000, the dummy equals zero.  
Rank* Firm’s rank based on end of May market capitalization. 
FloatAdj Firm end of May market cap rank minus end of June assigned rank. 
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Indmedian A dummy indicates whether firm earnings management is below the 
industry median in given year.  
Preference Firm preference is institution preference on firm earnings management 
in given year. First, I calculate the dollar-weighted average of the 











 , then I calculate institution’s preference on firm 
earnings management:  𝐸𝑀𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡,𝑓 = ∑





𝑗 𝑠.𝑡.  𝑓∈𝐹𝑗,𝑡
𝑗 𝑠.𝑡 𝑓∈𝐹𝑗,𝑡
.  
Beat EPS A dummy indicates whether firm’s actual EPS beats the analyst 
forecast EPS. I take the difference between the actual EPS and analyst 
forecast EPS, if the value is equal to or larger than zero, the dummy 
equals 1; otherwise, the dummy equals zero.   
rank Firm’s rank based on how much the firm beats (fails) analyst forecast 
within beat EPS (fail EPS) group, to capture the distance to beat the 
EPS threshold.  
EPS surplus The difference between actual EPS and analyst forecast EPS.  
Annual return  By compounding monthly return obtained from CRSP to get firm 
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Passive Institutional Investors and Corporate Innovation 
(Joint with Yang Liu and Jun Wang) 
Innovation plays an important role in the growth of individual firms and the development of 
overall economy. According to a report issued by OECD in 2015, innovation (including 
technological progress embodied in physical capital, investment in knowledge-based capital, 
increased multi-factor productivity growth, and creative destruction) accounts for 
approximately 50% of a country’s GDP growth (He and Tian 2017). In this paper, we study the 
effect of passive institutional investors on corporate innovation. 
 Institutional investors can affect firms’ operation, either through their voice, which is a 
direct intervention (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Huddart 1993), or through the threat to exit 
which is an indirect intervention (Admita and Pfleiderer 2009; Edmans 2009; Edmans and 
Manso 2011). In a direct intervention, institutions can influence firm governance and decisions 
by using their voting rights so that they can directly impact a firm’s operation. In an indirect 
intervention, institutions can sell their holdings if the firm does not perform well, thus exerting 
a threat to exit and pushing managers to perform in a good manner. For the relation between 
institutional investors and innovation, Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013) document that 
higher institutional ownership is associated with more innovation, and the underlying channel 
is through reducing managerial career risks. In their study, they find that quasi-indexers, or 
passive institutional investors, have no effect on innovation. In contrast, He and Tian (2013) 
show that firms covered by a larger number of analysts generate fewer patents and patents with 
lower impact, and they attribute the negative effects to non-dedicated institutional investors. In 
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addition, Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) find that an increase in liquidity causes a reduction in 
future innovation, and they argue that quasi-indexers who use passive indexing strategies have 
little or no incentives to monitor, thus leading to lower innovative activity. Hence the evidence 
in the literature shows that passive institutional investors have no or negative impact on 
innovation. In this paper, by applying the Russell 1000 and 2000 Index reconstruction, we find 
that an increase in passive institutional investors contributes to more innovation, in both the 
quantity of patents and in the quality of patents.  
 At the end of May each year, Russell Investments ranks all U.S. firms based on their market 
capitalization; then, the first one thousand firms are included in the Russell 1000 index, while 
the next two thousand firms fall in the Russell 2000 index. Firms around the 1000th rank have 
very close market capitalization; however, because of their market capitalization ranks on the 
last trading day in May, they fall into different indices. Since the Russell index is value 
weighted, the top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher relative weights than the bottom 
firms in the Russell 1000. In addition, while the Russell 1000 total market cap is more than 10 
times larger than the Russell 2000 total market cap, the total dollar amount which includes both 
passive and active investors for the Russell 1000 is about half compared to the total dollar 
amount benchmarked to the Russell 2000. Therefore, top firms in the Russell 2000 receive a 
greater dollar amount compared to bottom firms in the Russell 1000 (Chang, Hong, and 
Liskovich 2015). Since firms cannot control small variations in market cap, index assignment 
near the threshold is as good as random. This random assignment leads to a significant 
difference in index weights around the threshold, and the sharp difference in index weights 
around the cutoff point drives an exogenous variation in quasi-indexers’ ownership. By 
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applying this index reconstruction setting, we can test the causality between quasi-indexers and 
innovation.1 
We find that the Russell 2000 index inclusion drives a discontinuity in quasi-indexers’ 
ownership: top firms in the Russell 2000 have around 8% more quasi-indexers than bottom 
firms in the Russell 1000. Using the predicated quasi-indexers’ ownership to test the impact on 
innovation, our results show that an exogenous increase in quasi-indexers leads to an increase 
in firm innovation in both the number of patents and citations.    
To explore the underlying mechanisms, we find that quasi-indexers reduce the CEO 
turnover probability, and this mitigates CEOs’ career concern and allows them to do more 
innovation. We also find that quasi-indexers pay more attention on relative performance. If a 
firm’s performance is below the industry median, CEO is more likely to be fired if there are 
more passive institutional investors. In addition, we find that an increase in passive institutional 
investor ownership leads to more non-executive granted options, and employee options 
contribute to more innovation.  
Our paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the positive effect of passive 
institutional investors on corporate innovation. We also provide possible explanations for the 
mechanism on why passive institutional investors contribute to innovation.  
                                                             
 
1 Several studies have employed the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff to analyze the price effect of 
addition and deletion from the Russell index (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich 2015), the 
association between institutional holding and payout policy (Crane, Michenaud, and Weston 
2016), managerial disclosure (Boone and White 2015), acquisition and CEO power (Schmidt 
and Fahlenbrach 2016), monitoring incentives (Fich, Harford,and Tran 2015), and the effect of 





1. Data and Russell index background  
1.1 Sample  
The sample includes firms in the Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000 from years 1995 to 2006, 
since after that there is a banding rule which introduces noise to the identification. In that case, 
it’s not clear whether it is because of the introduced noise that causes the results, so we keep 
the sample to year 2006. We obtain the index membership data from Bloomberg, then merge it 
with firm-level accounting data from Compustat, institutional ownership data from Thomson 
Reuters 13F filing, and security market data from CRSP. The institutional investor types are 
from Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001). We obtain innovation data from NBER and 
Leonid Kogan, Dimitris Papanikolaou, Amit Seru, and Noah Stoffman (KPSS) patent data. The 
patent data is collected through 2010 to mitigate the truncation issue. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics. On average, institutional holdings account for 61% 
percent of firm’s total outstanding shares, the median is even higher, which is around 64%. We 
can see that institutional investor is really an important participant in the financial market. 
When separate institutional investors based on their investment horizon and portfolio 
diversification (Bushee and Noe 2000; Bushee 2001), it can be divided into dedicated investors 
(long horizon, concentrated portfolio), quasi-indexers (long horizon, diversified portfolio), and 
transient investors (short horizon and diversified portfolio). Most of institutional holdings are 
quasi indexers, which account for 38% of firms’ total shares outstanding. Transient investors 
account for 15% while dedicated investors account for 8%. For firms’ innovation activity, the 
total number of patent applied and granted for one firm in each year is around 17.5, and for 
each patent, the number of citation is around 3.17 per year. We can find that for firms around 
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the 25 percentile and the median, the patent number and citation per patent are zero, which 
indicates that innovation activity are versatile and mainly concentrated in some firms. For other 
firm characteristics, which includes size, market to book, return on assets, KZ index, leverage, 
firm age, R&D input, and Tobin’s Q, are consistent with prior literature. These firm 
characteristics are used as control variables in the analysis, which are described in detail in the 
Appendix.  
 
1.2 Russell index background  
During June each year, FTSE Russell ranks all U.S. firms based on their market capitalization 
on the last trading day in May. As Figure 1 shows, the first 1000 firms constitute the Russell 
1000 index and the subsequent 2000 firms go to the Russell 2000. Rank zero means the cutoff 
point which is the 1000th rank. At the end of June each year, Russell Investments publishes the 
new index list and the financial market will follow the new list from the next trading day till 
June of the following year. The market cap is calculated by multiplying the closing price on the 
last trading day in May and the total common shares outstanding. When there are more than 
two classes of shares, Russell will use the share price of the class with the largest number of 
float shares.  
   For firms around the 1000th rank which is the cutoff point to determine the index 
membership, there is a fundamental reason to expect a sharp change in institutional ownership. 
As Figure 1 shows, firms around the threshold have comparable market caps; since firms 
cannot control small variations in market capitalization on a determined day, the assignment to 
different indexes is as good as random. In addition, Russell index is value weighted, so top 
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firms in the Russell 2000, which are the largest firms in the Russell 2000, receive much higher 
weights compared to bottom firms in the Russell 1000, which are the smallest firms in the 
Russell 1000. Figure 2 plots the index weight and the market cap rank for firms in the Russell 
1000 and Russell 2000 around ±500 bandwidths from the cutoff point. We can see that the top 
firms in the Russell 2000 (rank from 0 to 500) receive much higher weights compared to the 
bottom firms in the Russell 1000 (rank from -500 to 0). And as it is closer to the cutoff points, 
the difference becomes even larger.  
The Russell indexes attract a large amount of investments. According to Russell 
Investments’ 2008 U.S. Equity Indexes: Institutional Benchmark Survey, the number of 
products benchmarked to the Russell 2000 is about 2/3 compared to the number benchmarked 
to the S&P 500; the dollar amount is about 1/7 compared to that of the S&P 500; and the ratios 
are increasing over time. The Russell 1000 index firm total market cap is around 10 times that 
of the Russell 2000; however, the Russell 1000 attracts only half the total dollar amount 
compared to dollars invested in the Russell 2000 index, and there are two to three times more 
dollars passively tracking the Russell 1000 than the Russell 2000. Since the Russell Index is 
value-weighted, top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher weights than bottom firms in 
the Russell 1000. In addition, more dollars are invested in the Russell 2000, so the top firms in 
the Russell 2000 receive a greater dollar amount compared to the bottom Russell 1000 firms. 
The institutional holding for top firms in the Russell 2000 is correspondingly much higher than 
for bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Figure 3 presents quasi-indexers’ ownership for firms 
around the threshold when the bandwidth equals ±500. The figure indicates that there is a 
significant variation in institutional ownership for firms around the cutoff point: firms at the 
50 
 
top of the Russell 2000 have around 8% more institutional holdings compared to the bottom 
firms in the Russell 1000. Closer to the cutoff point, the difference is even larger. This evidence 
shows that the random assignment into difference indexes leads to a sharp difference in index 
weight and a subsequent exogenous change in institutional holdings.   
   Since Russell Investment uses its proprietary data to calculate the market cap, which 
cannot be exactly identified by CRSP and Compustat, we use the actual assignment instead of 
the end of May market cap as the instrument for institutional holding in order to capture the 
relationship more precisely. In addition, after 2007, Russell introduced a “banding” rule to 
maintain consistency for index constitution. Under this new rule, only if a firm’s market cap 
change is big enough, can it switch to the other index; otherwise, the firm will still stay in its 
current index, which leads to a stickiness in index membership. To be more specific, firms are 
ranked in a descending order based on their end of May market caps, and a cumulative market 
cap is calculated for each firm. Then, the cumulative market cap is divided by total market cap 
of all Russell 3000E firms to get the market cap ratio for each firm. Based on this market cap 
ratio, a firm will jump into the other index only if its market cap ratio is more than ±2.5% away 
compared to the 1000th firm market cap ratio. We can tell this banding rule reduces the turnover 
for index constitution. To validate the random assignment, we study the effect up to year 2006. 
 
2. Identification and methodology 
For firms around the 1000th rank but been assigned to different indexes, they have very close 
market capitalization, so the assignment is as good as random. However, since Russell index is 
value weighted, top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher index weights as they are the 
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largest firms in the index, and bottom firms in the Russell 1000 have much lower weight as 
they are the smallest firm in the Russell 1000. Since market cap ratio for the Russell 1000 and 
the Russell 2000 is around 10:1, and the dollar amounts ratio that passively tracking the Russell 
1000 and the Russell 2000 is 2:1, top firms in Russell 2000 receive more dollar passively 
tracking the firm than bottom firms in the Russell 1000, which leads to an exogenous variation 
in the quasi-indexer ownership. 
To identify the causal relation between quasi-indexer and innovation, we implement the 
regression discontinuity design with the 2SLS model as follows: 
𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡    (1)           
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖?̂? + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (2)            
   The first stage regression equation (1) is based on regression discontinuity design, we use 
Russell2000, which indicates whether the firm belongs to the Russell 2000, as the instrument 
for quasi-indexer ownership. The underlying assumption is: for firms around the index 
threshold that have been assigned to the Russell 2000 instead of the Russell 1000, there is an 
exogenous variation in institutional holdings, especially for quasi-indexers; and whether the 
firm belongs to Russell 2000 is not directly correlated with innovation. 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ )  is a 
function based on a firm’s market cap rank which includes (Rank-1000), and 
Russell2000*(Rank-1000), to account for the distance to the index threshold. FloatAdj is the 
proxy for Russell index float adjustment, computed as the difference between end of May 
market cap rank and the actual rank assigned by Russell Investments in June. By including this 
variable, we also control the variation in index weight caused by Russell Investments’ 
adjustment on float shares. X stands for firm characteristics which includes size, market to book, 
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return on assets, KZ index, leverage, firm age, R&D input, and Tobin’s Q, in addition to 
transient investor ownership.  
   In the second stage regression equation (2), we use the instrumented QIX obtained from 
the first stage to test the causal effect on firms’ innovation activity. Patent number per year and 
citation per patent are used to capture the innovation activity. We apply both current year 
innovation and year t+3 innovation activity since it may take time for quasi-indexers to exert 
their influence. We also control for Rank, Rank*Russell2000, FloatAdj, and firm 
characteristics including size, market to book, return on assets, KZ index, leverage, firm age, 
R&D input, and Tobin’s Q, transient ownership, same as with the first stage controls. In 
addition, both stages include year and industry fixed effect, also clustered by firm.  
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 OLS regression of quasi-indexers’ impact on innovation 
We first run the OLS regression to test the relation between quasi-indexer and innovation 
activity. Table 2 shows the results. Columns 1 and 2 use patent number in current year and year 
t+3 as the dependent variable to measure the innovation quantity, and columns 3 and 4 use 
citation per patent in current year and year t+3 as the dependent variable to measure the 
innovation quality. We can see the coefficient on quasi-indexer has mixed results. For the 
current year patent number, there is a negative insignificant result, while for the patent number 
in year t+3, there is a significant relation between quasi-indexer and innovation. When it comes 
to CitePat, which is the innovation quality, there is an insignificant and positive effect. From 
the results we can see, based on OLS regression, the relation between quasi-indexer and 
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innovation is not clear; in addition, the endogeneity concern exists. From the results on 
dedicated investor, we can see there is a positive effect on innovation, which is consistent with 
Aghion et al. (2013).  
 
3.2 Institutional holdings around the index threshold 
Since firms around the index threshold have comparable market caps and Russell index is value 
weighted, top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher weights than bottom firms in the 
Russell 1000. So, for each dollar invested in the index, top firms in the Russell 2000 receive 
more dollars compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Figure 3 shows this 
discontinuity around the cutoff point: top firms in the Russell 2000 have higher quasi-indexers’ 
holdings than bottom firms in the Russell 1000 and as it is closer to the threshold, the difference 
becomes larger.  
In this part, we first identify whether the inclusion in the Russell 2000 index can lead to a 
difference in institutional holdings, especially the quasi-indexers’ holding, and test whether this 
exogenous variation in quasi-indexers has a causal effect on firm innovation. Applying 
equation (1) regression, we test that whether firms that belong to the Russell 2000 have an 
exogenous change in institutional holdings. Then we separate institutional holdings into 
dedicated investor, quasi-indexer, and transient investors based on their investment horizon and 
portfolio concentration according to Bushee classification. 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) is a function based on 
firm’s end of May market cap rank which includes (Rank-1000), and Russell2000*(Rank-1000), 
to account for the distance to the index threshold. FloatAdj is the proxy for Russell index float 
adjustment, computed as the difference between end of May market cap rank and the actual 
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rank assigned by Russell Investments in June. X stands for firm characteristics which include 
size, market-to-book, return on assets, and leverage.  
For the institutional investors’ type, it is from Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001). 
The classification is based on investment diversification and turnover. Dedicated investors have 
long horizon holdings in a small number of firms. Quasi-indexers have long term investments 
in diversified firms. And transient investors have high portfolio turnover in diversified firms. 
So dedicated investors do not benchmark the index membership, instead, they cherry pick the 
stocks. In contrast, quasi indexers and transient investors have diversified portfolios, which is 
the main reason we can find an exogenous change in their holdings for top firms in the Russell 
2000 compared to bottom firms in the Russell 1000.  
Table 3 shows the results for different types of institutional investors. Panel A represents 
the results when the bandwidth is ±300 while panel B shows the results when bandwidth equals 
±500. Column 1 is for total institutional ownership while the next three columns are for 
dedicated investors, quasi-indexers, and transient investors, respectively. From panel A, we can 
see that in the first column there is an exogenous difference in institutional holding for firms 
around the cutoff: top firms in the Russell 2000 on average have 18% more institutional 
holdings compared to bottom firms in the Russell 1000, and it is statistically significant. Most 
of the difference comes from quasi-indexers: we can see from column 3, top firms in the Russell 
2000 has around 10% more quasi-indexers than bottom firms in the Russell 1000. There is no 
significant difference in dedicated investors from column 2 results. From column 4, we can see 
there is also an exogenous change in transient investors: firms in the top of the Russell 2000 
have 7% more transient investor holdings compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 1000. 
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Since there is a significant change in transient investors, in the IV regression, we also control 
for transient investors’ ownership to mitigate the concern from transient investors’ impact.  
Next, we repeat the same regression for when the bandwidth equals ±500, as presented in 
panel B. We can find the inclusion in the Russell 2000 leads to a difference in institutional 
holdings: firms in the top Russell 2000 have 14% more institutional ownership compared to 
bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Similar to the results in panel A, most of the difference comes 
from quasi indexers and transient investors, which account for 8% and 5% of the difference 
respectively. And for dedicated investors, there is no significant effect. As the bandwidth 
becomes larger, the magnitude becomes smaller since the difference in index weights also 
becomes smaller. Figure 2 and Figure 3 can further explain the underlying reason: as it is closer 
to the threshold, the difference of index weights between top firms in the Russell 2000 and 
bottom firms in the Russell 1000 is even larger, therefore the difference of institutional holdings 
also becomes larger; and when it goes far from the threshold, the difference of index weights 
between the two groups becomes smaller and the changes in institutional holdings also are 
smaller. Since in this paper we want to explore the passive investor’s impact on firm innovation, 
in the following analysis, we will concentrate on the quasi-indexers’ ownership. 
 
3.3 The quasi-indexer effect on innovation 
In this part, we test for the impact on firm innovation when there is an exogenous increase in 
quasi-indexer ownership. Table 4 shows the two stage least square regression based on 
equations (1) and (2) when the dependent variable is the patent number. Columns 1 and 3 are 
for when the bandwidth equals ±500 and columns 2 and 4 are for when the bandwidth equals 
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±300. The dependent variable for columns 1 and 2 is the current year patent number; for 
columns 3 and 4, it is the patent number in year t+3. We use ln (1+patent numbert+j) as the 
dependent variable to adjust for the skewness issue. From the first stage results, we can see the 
inclusion in the Russell 2000 leads to a 7% increase in quasi-indexers’ ownership when the 
bandwidth is ±500, and an 8% increase when the bandwidth is ±300.  
From the second stage results, in which using the predicted quasi-indexers’ ownership 
obtained from the first stage to test its effect on the patent number, we can see there is a 
significant positive relation between quasi-indexers and the patent number. From columns 1 
and 2, we can find when the quasi-indexer increases, the current year patent number also 
increases, both for when the window equals ±500 and for when the window equals ±300. From 
column 3 and column 4 we can find the positive effect persistent in year t+3: when quasi-
indexers’ ownership increases in the current year, it leads to an increase in the patent number 
in year t+3. From these results we can see quasi-indexers have a positive impact on the firm’s 
patent number, both in the current year and the future period.  
For innovation activity, patent number is the number of patents applied and granted in each 
year, so it measures the patent quantity. In addition, the quality of the patent is also important—
whether the patent is the widely cited and contributes to other innovative activity. So, in next 
part, we test whether the increase in quasi-indexers influences innovation quality. To measure 
innovation quality, we use the citation divided by the patent which measures the average 
citation for each patent. Then we take natural log of (1+CitePat) as the dependent variable for 
innovation quality. Table 5 shows the results on CitePat. In the first stage, the inclusion in the 
Russell 2000 leads to a 7% increase in quasi-indexer when the bandwidth is ±500 and an 8% 
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increase when the bandwidth is ±300. In the second stage, when we have a look at the 
coefficient of predicted quasi-indexer ownership, we can find there is a positive impact on 
patent citation. From columns 1 and 2, we can see that the increase in quasi-indexer ownership 
leads to an increase in citation per patent for both window sizes. From columns 3 and 4, we 
can find that quasi-indexers also have an influence on year t+3 CitePat, which indicates that an 
increase in quasi-indexers’ ownership can lead to higher innovation quality in the future years.  
From the results in Table 4 and Table 5, we can see the increase in passive investor has a 
positive impact on firm innovation activity, both the quantity and quality of the patent. When 
there are more quasi-indexers in a firm, they motivate the firm to further innovate—obtain 
more patents and have more high-quality patents. Although quasi-indexers are passive 
investors to some extent, they still care about firm’s operation and affect its decisions.  
 
4. The underlying mechanisms and possible explanations 
In this section, we investigate the mechanism through which quasi-indexers increase corporate 
innovation. Three potential channels could contribute to this positive casual effect. First of all, 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) showed that although quasi-indexers are passive investors, 
they are not passive owners. Better corporate governance due to quasi-indexers could be one 
channel that increases corporate innovation quantity as well as quality. In addition, we 
examined whether the existence of quasi-indexer alleviates a CEO’s career concern. Our results 
suggest that CEOs’ turnover probability will be lower with a larger quasi-indexer ownership. 
In the end, we tested whether a larger proportion of quasi-indexer ownership improves non-
executive employee stock option grants. Fu, Low, and Zhang (2015) find a positive effect of 
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non-executive employee stock options on the quantity and quality of innovation outcomes. Our 
test shows that quasi-indexers play positive roles in this channel by enhancing non-executive 
employees’ stock options. Overall, we provide these three channels that could be the underlying 
mechanism through which quasi-indexers improve corporate innovation. 
 
4.1 Quasi-indexer and corporate governance 
Using the same Russell 1000/2000 index setting, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) show how 
passive institutional investor influences a firms’ governance choices. Through their large voting 
blocs, quasi-indexers increase a firms’ independent directors and oppose takeover provisions. 
These two effects have proved quite critical for firms’ innovation. On one hand, Balsmeier, 
Fleming, and Manso (2017) show that firms that transition to independent boards focus on 
more crowded and familiar areas of technology. They patent and claim more and receive more 
total future citations to their patents. On the other hand, by comparing firms in states which 
pass antitakeover laws versus those firms located in states without antitakeover laws, 
Atanassov (2013) finds that this exogenous reduction in the threat of hostile takeovers dampens 
firms’ innovation production not only in quantity but also in quality. In sum, the claims that 
increased independent directors and alleviated takeover provision caused by quasi-indexers can 
improve firms’ innovation have been well documented by prior literature. 
 
4.2 Quasi-indexer and CEO turnover 
In this part, we study the role played by quasi-indexer in managerial turnover. CEO turnover 
data comes from Execucomp from 1995 to 2015. Stock returns are collected from CRSP. The 
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dependent variable equals to one if the CEO changed in year t+1. The summary statistics of 
CEO turnover and stock yearly return can be found in Table 6. Year return is firm i’s stock 
cumulative fiscal year return, which is negatively correlated with CEO turnover as expected. 
Compared with Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013), in which they show an insignificant 
correlation between institutional ownership and managerial forced turnover, we find that the 
proportion of equity owned by quasi-indexer significantly reduces the probability of CEO 
turnover. Idiosyncratic median is defined as the difference between a firm’s yearly return and 
the industry median yearly return. And idiosyncratic mean is defined as the difference between 
a firm’s yearly return and the industry average yearly return. Instead of the overall firm’s stock 
performance, these two measures capture firm i’s relative performance compared to the 
industry mean/median. Column 2 and column 3 indicate that the interaction term between 
quasi-indexer ownership and these two measures are both negative and significant. This is 
another piece of evidence that quasi-indexers are passive investors but not passive owners. 
They do not take it for granted and only focus on the level of stock return, but also care for the 
relative performance comparing to the industry situation.   
 
4.3 Quasi-indexer and non-executive employee stock option 
The last channel we propose is that quasi-indexers improve corporate innovation by enhancing 
non-executive employees’ incentive to innovate. Non-executive employees are the direct 
inventors in innovation activities. Their salary and work satisfaction are essential in the 
innovation process. For example, Chang, Change, Fu, Low, and Zhang (2015) find a positive 
effect of non-executive employee stock options on the quantity and quality of innovation 
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outcomes. Tong, Mao, and Tian (2017) show that the human capital fixed effect can explain a 
majority of the variation in innovation performance compared to the firm fixed effect.  
Chen, Hong, and Lin (2018) use the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes discontinuity to study 
the correlation between quasi-indexer ownership and corporate social responsibility. They 
found increased quasi-indexer equity ownership improve firms’ community, diversity, 
employee relation, environment, and product. In our study, we test whether more quasi-index 
ownership improves non-executive employees’ option grants. Non-executive employees’ 
option data is collected from Execucomp between 1995 and 2006. Three dependent variables 
are used, including non-executive option percentage, non-executive option value and non-
executive option number. The results are shown in Table 8. 
All of these three regressions indicate that the existence of quasi-indexers enhances firms’ 
stock options granted to non-executive employees. Specifically, one standard deviation change 
in quasi-indexer ownership increases the percentage of options granted to non-executive 
employees by 0.7%. Column 2 and column 3 change the dependent variable to next year’s non-
executive employee option value and total option number. These positive significant 
coefficients indicate that quasi-indexers increase the total number of options granted to non-
executive employees as well as the value of those options. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Institutional investors are important equity investors in the United States, and quasi-indexers 
are the main composition among institutional investors. Prior literature shows mixed evidence 
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about the role played by quasi-indexers in corporate innovation. This paper provide evidence 
that quasi-indexers help enhance corporate innovation. 
By exploiting variation in ownership around Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes, we find that 
the exogenous increment of passive institutional investors due to the Russel index assignments 
result in increased future patent output as well as patent quality. This result complements the 
finding by Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013), which only find the positive effects by 
dedicated institutional investors.  
Our study also contributes to the increased studies on passive institutional investors on 
firms’ investment and governance. We show that quasi-indexers are more perceptive when they 
evaluate CEO’s performance by emphasizing the relative performance rather than pure luck. 
The evidence that quasi-indexer can enhance the options granted to non-executive employees 
is also shown in this paper. Better employee satisfaction is one potential channel we proposed 
for passive institutional investors to improve corporate innovation. 
This study unveils the influence by passive institutional investors on corporate decisions. 
There could be more channels for passive institutional investors to alleviate managers’ concern 
and encourage riskier investment. Besides, the non-executive effects brought by passive 








Figure 1 Russell index market cap  
This figure plots the relation between firm market cap and corresponding end of May market 
cap ranking. The first 1000 firms go to the Russell 1000 and the subsequent 2000 firms go to 
the Russell 2000. The vertical line corresponds to firm market cap at the end of May. Rank in 
horizontal line indicates the distance to index threshold. Zero means the 1000th rank, which is 
the threshold for the index assignment. Negative numbers are for firms in the Russell 1000, 







Figure 2 Russell index weight 
This figure plots the relation between firm index weight and its market cap rank around 
threshold. The vertical line is the index weight in percentage and horizontal line is the distance 
to the threshold based on market cap rank. Zero means the 1000th rank, which is the threshold 
for index assignment. Negative numbers are for firms in the Russell 1000, and positive numbers 









Figure 3 Russell index and quasi-indexer ownership 
This figure plots the relation between quasi-indexer holdings and firm market cap rank around 
the threshold. The vertical line is firms’ quasi-indexer ownership and the horizontal line is the 
market cap rank. Rank indicates the distance to threshold. Zero means the 1000th rank, which 
is the threshold for index assignment. Negative numbers are for firms in the Russell 1000, and 





Table 1 Summary statistics 
This panel reports summary statistics of institutional holding, innovation measures, and firm 
characteristics for firms in the Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000, from 1995 to 2006. The table 
shows each variable’s mean, standard deviation, 25 percentile value, median, and 75 percentile 
value. Variables are defined in the Appendix. All variables are winsorized at 1% levels.  
 
 
 Mean Std. Dev p25 Median p75 
Total IO 0.61 0.24 0.43 0.64 0.80 
Dedicated 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.12 
Quasi indexer 0.38 0.18 0.25 0.38 0.50 
Transient 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.21 
Patent  17.47 118.48 0.00 0.00 3.00 
Cite/Pat 3.17 11.66 0.00 0.00 1.38 
Size 6.91 1.63 5.75 6.74 7.89 
ROA 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.18 
KZindex -7.09 15.78 -6.98 -1.54 0.29 
Leverage 0.22 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.35 
Ln(Age) 2.73 0.82 2.08 2.64 3.50 
R&DAsset  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 






Table 2 Panel regression for institutional investors effects on innovation 
This table presents panel regression that regresses innovation measure on different types of 
institutional investor: quasi-indexer, dedicated investor, and transient investors, in addition to 
firm characteristics, and year, firm fixed effects. Column 1 shows the regression for innovation 
patent. Column 2 shows the result for patent number in year t+3. Column 3 and 4 represent the 
results for CitePat in year t and year t+3. Coefficients are reported with t statistics in 
parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the two-tailed test.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 lnpat lnpat3 lncitepat lncitepat3 
QIX -0.000541 0.149*** 0.0142 0.0207 
 (-0.02) (4.10) (0.28) (0.51) 
DED 0.0854* 0.101* 0.0917 0.113* 
 (1.71) (1.88) (1.23) (1.88) 
TRA -0.0835** 0.127*** 0.109* 0.236*** 
 (-2.20) (3.07) (1.92) (5.12) 
Size 0.185*** 0.110*** 0.134*** 0.0549*** 
 (20.14) (11.11) (9.76) (4.96) 
KZindex 0.00116*** 0.000187 -0.00328*** -0.00213*** 
 (2.92) (0.43) (-5.50) (-4.40) 
Leverage -0.122*** -0.164*** -0.224*** -0.192*** 
 (-3.80) (-4.65) (-4.65) (-4.90) 
Ln(age) 0.0191 0.112*** 0.0332 0.100*** 
 (0.91) (4.95) (1.06) (3.98) 
R&DAsset 2.415*** 6.476*** 17.78*** 16.94*** 
 (3.02) (7.26) (14.82) (16.95) 
Tobin’s Q 0.00176 0.0226*** 0.0343*** 0.00905*** 
 (0.90) (10.57) (11.67) (3.80) 
Firm FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
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Table 3 Difference in institutional ownership around Russell index threshold 
This table shows the difference in institutional ownership for firms belong to different indexes 
around the index threshold. It represents the first stage estimation and divides institutional 
holdings into dedicated, quasi indexer and transient based on Bushee classification: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 , 
where Russell2000 is a dummy which indicates whether the firm is included in Russell 2000. 
The regression includes year and industry fixed effects. Table A shows the results when the 
window size is ±300, and table B represents the results when the window size is ±500. 
Coefficients are reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix.  
***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the two-tailed test.  
 
A. bandwidth is ±300 





Quasi indexer Transient 
ownership 
D 0.18*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.07*** 
 (11.43) (1.34) (8.76) (9.81) 
Rank -0.0003*** -0.00001 -0.0001** -0.0002*** 
 (-4.68) (-0.31) (-2.45) (-6.38) 
Rank*D -0.0002*** -0.00002 -0.0002*** -0.00002 
 (-3.00) (-0.46) (-3.85) (-0.62) 
Float adj 0.0007*** 0.00005 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (11.89) (1.48) (8.94) (11.56) 
_cons 0.33*** -0.1 0.19*** 0.22*** 
 (4.25) (-1.63) (3.04) (5.53) 
N 5862 5804 5862 5860 
 
B. bandwidth is ±500 





Quasi indexer Transient 
ownership 
D 0.14*** 0.009 0.08*** 0.05*** 
 (12.06) (1.51) (9.70) (8.95) 
Rankm5 -0.0002*** -0.00001 -0.0001*** -0.00007*** 
 (-5.43) (-0.42) (-3.51) (-4.81) 
Rankm5*D -0.0001*** -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00005*** 
 (-3.09) (-0.92) (-1.49) (-3.08) 
Float adj 0.0005*** 0.00004* 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (13.54) (1.76) (9.77) (14.15) 
_cons 0.39*** -0.03 0.16*** 0.24*** 
 (6.61) (-0.54) (2.78) (6.72) 





Table 4 Quasi-indexer’s impact on firm patent: IV estimates 
This table represents the two-stage instrumental variable regression based on the equations as 
below: first stage uses whether firm is belonging to Russell 2000 as an instrument to predict 
institutional ownership: 
𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,  
The second stage regression uses the predicted QIX obtained in the first stage to test the effects 
on patent number: 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖?̂? + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.  
Dependent variable is firm level patent number. All results are estimated using ranks implied 
by firms’ end of May market capitalization within the assigned index as of the index assignment 
date. Columns 1 and 3 are for window size equals ±500, and columns 2 and 4 are for window 
size equals ±300. Both stages include year and industry fixed effect. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in the 
Appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the two-































 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ±500 ±300 ±500 ±300 
First stage Quasi Indexer 
Russell2000 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 (9.12) (7.81) (8.51) (7.32) 
Second stage Ln(Pat) Ln(Pat) Ln(Pat3) Ln(Pat3) 
𝑄𝐼?̂? 1.64** 2.41*** 2.18*** 2.70*** 
 (2.36) (2.85) (3.40) (3.45) 
Rank -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-6.17) (-3.56) (-5.65) (-3.39) 
Rank*R2000 0.0004** 0.002 0.0003* 0.0002 
 (2.12) (0.65) (1.95) (0.82) 
FloatAdj 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
 (2.10) (1.21) (1.26) (0.62) 
Size 0.09** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
 (2.55) (2.66) (2.85) (2.97) 
ROA -1.50*** -1.56*** -1.03*** -1.01*** 
 (-5.77) (-5.47) (-4.11) (-3.69) 
KZindex 0.002** 0.002 -0.00001 0.000564 
 (2.05) (1.30) (-0.01) (0.43) 
Leverage -0.41*** -0.46*** -0.37*** -0.37*** 
 (-3.37) (-3.16) (-3.28) (-2.73) 
Ln(age) 0.02 -0.04 -0.025 -0.08* 
 (0.53) (-0.80) (-0.62) (-1.71) 
R&D/Asset 30.99*** 54.21*** 27.95*** 53.61*** 
 (5.46) (6.95) (4.86) (6.69) 
Tobin’s Q 0.007 0.002 0.034*** 0.022** 
 (0.85) (0.16) (3.99) (2.32) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
















Table 5 Institutional ownership effects on innovation citation: IV estimates 
This table represents the two-stage instrumental variable regression based on the equations as 
below: first stage uses whether firm is belonging to Russell 2000 as an instrument to predict 
institutional ownership: 
𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,  
The second stage regression uses the predicted QIX obtained in first stage to test the effects on 
citation per patent: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖?̂? + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.  
Dependent variable CitePat is based on firm level. All results are estimated using ranks implied 
by firms’ end of May market capitalization within the assigned index as of the index assignment 
date. Columns 1 and 3 are for window size equals ±500, and columns 2 and 4 are for window 
size equals ±300. Both stages include year and industry fixed effect. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in the 
































 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ±500 ±300 ±500 ±300 
First stage Quasi Indexer 
Russell2000 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 (9.12) (7.81) (8.51) (7.32) 
Second stage Ln(CitePat) Ln(CitePat) Ln(CitePat3) Ln(CitePat3) 
𝑄𝐼?̂? 0.92* 2.19*** 0.98** 1.49*** 
 (1.65) (3.01) (2.29) (2.75) 
Rank -0.0004*** -0.001*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** 
 (-3.89) (-3.30) (-4.24) (-3.35) 
Rank*R2000 0.0002* 0.0004 0.0002* 0.0003 
 (1.70) (1.61) (1.68) (1.57) 
FloatAdj 0.00001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.00001 
 (0.11) (-1.10) (0.96) (-0.09) 
Size 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.06** 
 (3.36) (2.60) (3.09) (2.44) 
ROA -0.21 -0.47** 0.08 0.05 
 (-1.08) (-1.98) (0.55) (0.30) 
KZindex -0.001 -0.002 -0.0005 -0.00004 
 (-1.31) (-1.42) (-0.61) (-0.04) 
Leverage -0.30*** -0.36*** -0.21*** -0.19** 
 (-3.55) (-3.23) (-3.28) (-2.37) 
Ln(age) -0.004 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06** 
 (-0.13) (-1.46) (-1.05) (-1.98) 
R&D/Asset 43.68*** 55.49*** 32.36*** 44.77*** 
 (7.96) (6.58) (7.74) (7.22) 
Tobin’s Q 0.02 0.0111 0.007 -0.004 
 (1.36) (0.71) (0.88) (-0.45) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 





Table 6 Summary statistics for data of underlying mechanisms 
This panel reports summary statistics of CEO turnover, employee options granted, institutional 
holding, and firm characteristics. CEO turnover, institutional holding and firm characteristics 
are from 1995 to 2015. Option granted data are from 1995 to 2006 because of data availability. 
The table shows each variable’s mean, standard deviation, 25 percentile value, median, and 75 
percentile value. Variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. All variables are winsorized 
at 1% levels.  
 
 Mean Std. Dev p25 Median p75 
CEO turnover 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-executive percentage 69.83 27.62 59.64 74.63 85.72 
Non-executive option value 52824.21 583576.80 2101.30 6759.98 22719.10 
Non-executive option number 3760.76 38672.66 277.52 715.08 2011.94 
Quasi indexer 0.49 0.17 0.38 0.50 0.61 
Year return 0.16 0.52 -0.14 0.10 0.36 
Size 7.48 1.69 6.25 7.34 8.59 
ROA 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.20 
KZindex 0.75 1.13 0.15 0.81 1.45 
Leverage 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.34 
Ln(Age) 3.06 0.71 2.56 3.09 3.69 
R&DAsset  0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.03 





Table 7 The relation between quasi-indexer and CEO turnover 
This table shows the logit regression of quasi-indexer’s effect on CEO turnover. Dependent 
variable is the next period CEO turnover. Industry median is the industry median return, and 
idiosyncratic median is the difference between a firm’s year return and the industry median 
return. Industry mean is the industry average return, and idiosyncratic mean is the difference 
between a firm’s year return and the industry mean return. t-statistics are reported in the 
parenthesis. Control variables are defined in detail in the Appendix.  ***, ** and* indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the two-tailed test. 
 f (CEO turnover) 
QIX -0.386*** -0.380*** -0.426*** 
 (-2.99) (-2.93) (-3.25) 
Year return -0.507*** -0.314*** -0.321*** 
 (-10.38) (-2.97) (-3.03) 
QIX*industry median  0.267  
  (0.89)  
QIX*idiosyncratic median  -0.555**  
  (-2.33)  
QIX*industry mean   0.116 
   (0.41) 
QIX*idiosyncratic mean   -0.523** 
   (-2.21) 
Size 0.0293** 0.0307** 0.0304** 
 (2.00) (2.10) (2.08) 
ROA -1.412*** -1.419*** -1.423*** 
 (-7.03) (-7.09) (-7.10) 
KZindex 0.0170 0.0177 0.0172 
 (0.68) (0.71) (0.68) 
Leverage -0.0544 -0.0620 -0.0578 
 (-0.32) (-0.37) (-0.34) 
Ln(age) 0.0741** 0.0725** 0.0724** 
 (2.28) (2.23) (2.23) 
R&D/Asset -1.113*** -1.114*** -1.112*** 
 (-2.80) (-2.80) (-2.80) 
Tobin’s Q -0.00358 -0.00401 -0.00382 
 (-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.19) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 





Table 8 The relation between quasi-indexer and no-executive option granted 
This table shows the panel regression of quasi-indexer’s effect on non-executive options 
granted. Dependent variable is the next period non-executive options in percentage, the value 
of non-executive options granted, and the number of non-executive options granted. For option 
value and option number, it is in ln (1+f.option value) and ln (1+f.option number). t-statistics 
are reported in the parenthesis. Control variables are defined in detail in the Appendix.  ***, 
** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the two-tailed test. 
 
 
 f (non-executive 
percent) 




QIX 4.158** 0.528*** 0.261** 
 (1.97) (3.45) (2.10) 
Size 4.313*** 0.643*** 0.423*** 
 (8.58) (17.66) (14.30) 
ROA 0.621 1.034*** -0.0923 
 (0.27) (6.29) (-0.69) 
KZindex -0.148 -0.0156 -0.0260 
 (-0.35) (-0.50) (-1.03) 
Leverage -3.371 -0.720*** -0.0480 
 (-1.23) (-3.64) (-0.30) 
Ln(age) -3.615** -0.798*** -0.373*** 
 (-2.28) (-6.94) (-3.99) 
R&D/Asset 0.602 0.685* 0.0114 
 (0.12) (1.89) (0.04) 
Tobin’s Q 0.815*** 0.191*** 0.0674*** 
 (4.05) (13.08) (5.69) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 


















IO Institutional ownership obtained from 13f 
DED The proportion of dedicated institutional investor holdings based on 
Bushee classification.  
QIX The proportion of quasi-indexer institutional investor holdings based on 
Bushee classification. 




A dummy indicates whether firm belongs to the Russell 2000. If the 
firm is in Russell 2000, the dummy equals one; if the firm is in Russell 
1000, the dummy equals zero.  
Rank* Firm’s rank based on end of May market capitalization. 
FloatAdj Firm end of May market cap rank minus end of June assigned rank. 
CEO turnover A dummy variable indicates whether there is CEO change in the current 
year. We obtain the CEO relevant data from Compustat then identify 
whether current year CEO is same as last year CEO. If it is different, 
the dummy equals 1; otherwise, the dummy equals zero.  
Year return Cumulate monthly stock return to annual stock return based on each 
fiscal year. The data is obtained from CRSP.  
Industry median The industry median year return based on first two digits SIC code.  
Idiosyncratic 
median 
The difference between firm year return and industry median return. 
Industry mean The industry average year return based on first two digits SIC code. 
Idiosyncratic mean The difference between firm year return and industry average return. 
Non-executive 
percentage 
The proportion of option granted to non-executive employees. We 
obtain executive’s percentage of total option granted to employees 
(pcttotopt) from Compustat, then subtract executive part from 100% to 
get non-executive proportion of option granted.     
Non-executive 
option value 
The value of non-executive employee’s option based on Black-Scholes 
model (blkshval).  
Non-executive 
option number 
The number of non-executive employee’s option (numsecur) 
KZindex Kaplan and Zingales index kz is computed as KZ= -1.002*cash flow - 
39.36*dividends - 1.315*cash holding +3.139* Leverage +0.283* 
Tobin’s Q 
Age Number of years of firm i’s existed on Compustat 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s patents that filed and eventually 
granted in year t+j 
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s citation per patent that filed and 
eventually granted in year t+j 
R&DAsset Research and development expenditure (xrd) scaled by firm i’s total 
asset   
ROA Firm i’s profitability, measured by operating income before 
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depreciation scaled by book value of asset  
Tobin’s Q Firm i’s Tobin’s Q, measured by book value of asset minus book value 
of equity plus market value of equity minus balance sheet deferred 
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The effect of institutional ownership on insider trading: evidence from regression 
discontinuity design 
 
Insiders, who are the managers or directors of a firm, usually possess more information about 
the firm’s operation than small outside investors. Based on insiders having superior information 
about their company, there are two streams of arguments about the consequences of insider 
trading. On the one hand, insider trading conveys information to the public, so that stock prices 
incorporate more relevant information and become more efficient. Leland (1992) shows that 
when insider trading is allowed, share prices better reflect information. On the other hand, by 
taking advantage of their superior information, insiders gain higher returns based on their 
transactions, while external investors lose money. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insiders 
seem to be able to predict cross-sectional stock return. Jeng, Zeckhauser, and Metrick (2003) 
also find insider purchases earn abnormal returns of more than 6 percent per year. Martins and 
Olivier (2008) document that at the individual stock level, insiders’ sales peak many months 
before a large drop in the stock price. Since insider trading has both positive and negative 
effects on the financial market, it is important to better understand insiders’ behavior.  
 Institutional investors may influence insiders’ behavior. Based on existing literature, 
institutional investors can exert influence on firm governance, either through their voice as the 
shareholder which is a direct intervention (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Huddart 1993), or through 
threats to exit which is an indirect intervention (Admita and Pfleiderer 2009; Edmans 2011; 
Edmans and Manso 2011). To directly intervene, institutions use their voting rights to influence 
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firm governance and operations. To indirectly intervene, institutions can threaten to sell their 
holdings if the firm does not perform well, and thereby push managers to be more self-
disciplined and behave in a manner that is consistent with shareholders’ goals. From this 
evidence, we can see that institutional investors can influence managers’ behavior and affect a 
firm’s operation.  
 To understand the relation between institutional holding and insider trading, Fidrmuc, 
Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) find that in the United Kingdom, firms whose dominant 
shareholders are institutional investors have higher cumulative abnormal returns for insider 
trading. The results indicate that institutional shareholders in the U.K. do not monitor the firm 
in which they invest and do not mitigate problems of asymmetric information. However, there 
is no direct evidence that shows how the ownership structure of institutional holdings affects 
insider trading in the U.S. market. Sias and Whidbee (2010) find that institutional investors are 
more likely to provide the liquidity necessary for insiders to trade. They find institutional 
investors are liquidity providers for insiders, but it is not clear how the ownership structure 
affects insider trading behavior. In this paper, by using the Russell index rebalance in which 
there is an exogenous variation in institutional holdings, I try to explore institutional investors’ 
effect on insider trading.  
 During the June of each year, Russell Investments ranks all U.S. firms based on their 
market capitalization on the last trading day in May; then, the first one thousand firms are 
included in the Russell 1000, while the next two thousand firms fall in the Russell 2000. Firms 
around the 1000th rank have very close market capitalization; however, because of their market 
capitalization ranks on the last trading day in May, they fall into different indexes. Since the 
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Russell index is value weighted, the top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher weights 
than the bottom firms in the Russell 1000. In addition, while the Russell 1000 total market cap 
is more than 10 times larger than the Russell 2000 total market cap, the total dollar amount 
which includes both passive and active investors for the Russell 1000 is about half compared 
to the total dollar amount benchmarked to the Russell 2000. Therefore, the top firms in the 
Russell 2000 receive a greater dollar amount compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 1000 
(Chang, Hong, and Liskovich 2015). Since firms cannot control small variations in market cap, 
index assignment near the threshold is as good as random. This random assignment leads to a 
big difference in index weights around the threshold, and the sharp difference in index weights 
around the cutoff point drives an exogenous variation in institutional ownership. By applying 
this index reconstruction setting, I can test the causal relation between institutional holdings 
and insider trading behavior.  
 Based on the instrument variable regression, I find that the increase in institutional 
holdings leads to a decrease in the frequency of insider trading, and the decrease in frequency 
is from both purchase level and sale level. The results indicate that the presence of more 
institutional holdings leads insiders to trade less frequently, on both the buying and the selling 
side. In addition, there is also a decrease in trading volume and most of the effect comes from 
purchase level, which indicates that institutional investors inhibit insider trading volumes, 
especially for purchase activity. 
 To explore the underlying mechanism that drives the decrease in insider trading activity, I 
find that institutional investors mitigate the information asymmetry and affect the market 
impact of insider trading, so that they inhibit insiders from taking advantage of the superior 
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information. I use the bid-ask spread to capture the information asymmetry, and use turnover 
ratio to explore the market impact concern. For firms with more severe information asymmetry, 
which is accompanies with higher bid-ask spreads, it’s easier for insiders to take advantage of 
their superior information, so there is a positive relation between bid-ask spread and insider 
trading activity. However, for firms with higher levels of institutional investors, this positive 
relation has been mitigated, which means the existence of institutional investors mitigates the 
information asymmetry and thus inhibits insiders taking advantage of their information. In 
addition, for firms with higher turnover ratios, it is easier for insiders to trade in large volume 
without much concern for the market impact, which indicates a positive relation between 
turnover ratio and trading volume. I find that with the existence of more institutional holdings, 
this effect is also alleviated: for firms with similar levels of turnover ratio, a larger fraction of 
institutional holding inhibits insiders from trading more shares, as the presence of institutional 
investors strengthens insiders’ concern on the price impact and insiders trade in lower volume 
accordingly.  
 There is current literature that focuses on the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff to analyze the price 
effect of addition and deletion from the Russell index (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich 2015), the 
association between institutional holding and payout policy (Crane, Michenaud, and Weston 
2016), CEO compensation (Mullins 2015), management disclosure (Boone and White 2015), 
acquisition and CEO power (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2016), monitoring incentives (Fich, 
Harford, and Tran 2015), and passive investor effect on firm governance (Appel, Gormley, and 
Keim 2016; Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2017). According to my best knowledge, this is the 
first paper that applies the Russell index reconstitution setting to test the causal relation 
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between institutional holding and insider trading behavior.  
  
1.  Data and Russell index background  
1.1 Sample  
The sample includes firms in the Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000 from years 1995 to 2006, 
since after that there is a banding rule which introduces noise to the identification. In that case, 
it’s not clear whether the findings are because of the introduced noise, so I keep the data to year 
2006. I obtain the index membership data from Bloomberg, then merge it with firm 
characteristics data from Compustat, institutional ownership data and insider trading data from 
Thomson Reuters, and security market data from CRSP. The institutional investor types are 
from Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001). 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the whole sample. On average, institutional 
holdings account for 60 percent of firm total outstanding shares, and the median is even higher, 
around 62 percent. We can see that the institutional investor is an important participant in the 
financial market. Based on Bushee and Noe’s investor classification (2000), institutional 
investors can be separated based on investment horizon and portfolio diversification, and 
divided as dedicated investors (long horizon, concentrated portfolio), quasi-indexers (long 
horizon, diversified portfolio), and transient investors (short horizon and diversified portfolio). 
Most of institutional holdings are from quasi indexers, which account for 37% of firms’ total 
shares outstanding. Transient investors’ ownership is round 15% while dedicated investors’ 
holding is around 8%. For insider trading, the average frequency is around 45 transactions per 
year, and the trading volume is around 2% each year. For other firm characteristics, it is 
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consistent with prior literature, which includes size, market to book, return on assets, and 
leverage. These variables are used as controls in the analysis. Firm characteristic variables are 
described in detail in the Appendix.  
 
1.2 Russell index background  
During the June of each year, Russell Investments ranks all firms based on their market 
capitalizations on the last trading day in May. As Figure 1 shows, the first 1000 constitute the 
Russell 1000 and the subsequent 2000 firms go to the Russell 2000. At the end of June each 
year, Russell Investments publishes the new index list and the financial market will follow the 
new list from the next trading day till June of the following year. The market cap is calculated 
by multiplying closing price on the last trading day in May and the total common shares 
outstanding. When there are more than two classes of shares, Russell will use the share price 
of the class with the largest number of float shares.  
   For firms around the 1000th rank, which is the cutoff point to determine the index 
membership, there is a fundamental reason to expect a sharp change in institutional ownership. 
As Figure 1 shows, firms around the index threshold have comparable market caps, since firms 
cannot control small variations in the market capitalization on a determined day, the assignment 
to different indexes is as good as random. Russell index is value weighted, so top firms in the 
Russell 2000 receives much higher weights compare to bottom firms in the Russell 1000. 
Figure 2 plots the index weight and the market cap rank for firms in the Russell 1000 and the 
Russell 2000 around ±500 bandwidths from the cutoff point. We can see top firms in the Russell 
2000 (rank from 0 to 500) receive much higher weights compared to bottom firms in the Russell 
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1000 (rank from -500 to 0). As it is closer to the cutoff points, the difference becomes larger.  
The Russell indexes attract a large amount of investments. According to Russell 
Investments’ 2008 U.S. Equity Indexes: Institutional Benchmark Survey, the number of 
products benchmarked to the Russell 2000 is about 2/3 compared to the number benchmarked 
to the S&P 500; the dollar amount is about 1/7 compared to that of the S&P 500; and the ratios 
are increasing over time. The Russell 1000 index firm total market cap is around 10 times that 
of the Russell 2000; however, the Russell 1000 attracts only half the total dollar amount 
compared to dollars invested in the Russell 2000 index, and there are two to three times more 
dollars passively tracking the Russell 1000 than the Russell 2000. Since the Russell Index is 
value-weighted, top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher weights than bottom firms in 
the Russell 1000. In addition, more dollars are invested in the Russell 2000, so the top firms in 
the Russell 2000 receive a greater dollar amount compared to the bottom Russell 1000 firms. 
The institutional holding for top firms in the Russell 2000 is correspondingly much higher than 
for bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Figure 3 presents institutional holdings for firms around 
the threshold when bandwidth equals ±500. The figure indicates that there is a significant 
variation in institutional ownership for firms around the cutoff point: firms at top of the Russell 
2000 have around 10% more institutional holdings compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 
1000. Closer to the cutoff point, the difference is even larger. This evidence shows that the 
random assignment into difference indexes leads to a sharp difference in index weight and a 
subsequent exogenous change in institutional holdings.   
 Since Russell Investment uses its proprietary data to calculate the market cap, which 
cannot be exactly identified by CRSP and Compustat, I use the actual assignment instead of 
86 
 
the end of May market cap as the instrument for institutional holding in order to capture the 
relationship more precisely. In addition, after 2007, Russell introduced a “banding” rule to 
maintain consistency for index constitution. Under this new rule, only if a firm’s market cap 
change is big enough, can it switch to the other index; otherwise, the firm will still stay in its 
current index, which leads to a stickiness in index membership. To be more specific, firms are 
ranked in a descending order based on their end of May market caps, and a cumulative market 
cap is calculated for each firm. Then, the cumulative market cap is divided by total market cap 
of all Russell 3000E firms to get the market cap ratio for each firm. Based on this market cap 
ratio, a firm will jump into the other index only if its market cap ratio is more than ±2.5% away 
compared to the 1000th firm market cap ratio. We can tell this banding rule reduces the turnover 
for index constitution. To validate the random assignment, I study the effect up to year 2006. 
 
2.  Identification and methodology 
To identify the causal relation between institutional ownership and insider trading, I implement 
the regression discontinuity design with the 2SLS model as follows: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡      (1)           
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (2)            
   The first stage regression equation (1) is based on regression discontinuity design. I use 
Russell2000, which indicates whether the firm belongs to the Russell 2000, as the instrument 
for institutional ownership. The underlying assumption is: for firms around the index threshold 
that have been assigned to the Russell 2000 instead of the Russell 1000, there is an exogenous 
variation in institutional holdings and whether the firm belongs to Russell 2000 is not directly 
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correlated with insider trading. 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) is a function based on a firm’s market cap rank 
which includes (Rank-1000), and Russell2000*(Rank-1000), to account for the distance to 
index threshold. FloatAdj is the proxy for Russell index float adjustment, computed as the 
difference between end of May market cap rank and the actual rank assigned by Russell 
Investments in June. By including this variable, I also control the variation in index weight 
caused by Russell Investments’ adjustment on float shares. X stands for firm characteristics 
which include size, market-to-book, return on assets, and leverage.  
   In the second stage regression equation (2), I use the instrumented IO obtained from the 
first stage to test the causal effect on insider trading. The insider trading measures are from 
current year July to next year June, since it may take time for institutions to exert their influence, 
as well as mitigate the rebalance issue in the subsequent year. I use insider trading frequency 
and trading volume in each year to capture insider trading activity. I also control for Rank*, 
FloatAdj, and firm characteristics which include size, market-to-book, return on assets, and 
leverage, same as with the first stage’s controls. Both stages include year and industry fixed 
effect, also clustered by firm.  
 
3.  Empirical results 
3.1 Institutional ownership around index threshold 
As the Russell index inclusion is based on the market cap rank of last trading day in May, firms 
around the threshold have comparable market caps, so the assignment is as good as random. In 
addition, Russell index is value weighted, which means top firms in the Russell 2000 have 
much higher index weights than bottom firms in Russell the 1000. So, for each dollar invested 
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in the index, top firms in the Russell 2000 receive much more dollar amounts compared to 
bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Figure 3 shows this discontinuity around the cutoff point: 
top firms in Russell 2000 have higher institutional holdings than bottom firms in Russell 1000 
and as it’s closer to the index threshold, the difference becomes larger.  
In this part, I first identify whether the inclusion in the Russell 2000 index can lead to a 
difference in institutional holdings. Applying equation (1) regression, I test whether firms that 
belong to the Russell 2000 have an exogenous change in institutional holdings. 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) is 
a function based on firm end of May market cap rank which includes (Rank-1000), and 
Russell2000*(Rank-1000), to account for the distance to index threshold. FloatAdj is the proxy 
for Russell index float adjustment, computed as the difference between end of May market cap 
rank and the actual rank assigned by Russell Investments in June. X stands for firm 
characteristics which include size, market-to-book, return on assets, and leverage.  
Institutional investor type is from Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001). The 
classification is based on diversification and turnover. Dedicated investors have long horizon 
holding in a small number of firms. Quasi indexers have long term investment in diversified 
firms. And transient investors have high portfolio turnover in diversified firms. So dedicated 
investors do not track index benchmarks; they cherry pick the stocks by themselves. In contrast, 
quasi indexers and transient investors have diversified portfolio. That is the main reason we 
can find an exogenous change in their holdings for top firms in the Russell 2000 compared to 
bottom firms in the Russell 1000.  
Table 2 shows the results. Panel A represents the results when bandwidth is ±300 while 
panel B shows the results when bandwidth equals ±500. Column 1 is for the total institutional 
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ownership while the next three columns are for dedicated investor, quasi-investor, and transient 
investor, respectively. From panel A, we can see in the first column there is a difference in 
institutional holding for firms around the cutoff: firms in the top Russell 2000 in general have 
18% more institutional holdings compared to bottom firms in the Russell 1000, and this is 
statistically significant. For the next three columns we can see most of the difference comes 
from quasi indexers and transient investors. Column 2 indicates there is marginal significant 
difference in dedicated investor. From column 3 and column 4, we can see there is an 
exogenous change in quasi indexers and transient investors: firms in top the Russell 2000 have 
11% more quasi indexer holdings, and 6.5% more transient investor holdings compared to 
bottom firms in the Russell 1000.  
I repeat the regression for larger bandwidth ±500, as presented in panel B. We can find the 
inclusion in Russell 2000 leads to a difference in institutional holdings: top firms in the Russell 
2000 have 14% more institutional ownership compared to bottom firms in Russell 1000. 
Similar to the results in panel A, most of the difference comes from quasi indexers and transient 
investors, which account for 9% and 4% respectively. As the bandwidth becomes larger, the 
magnitude becomes smaller since the difference in index weight also becomes smaller. Figure 
2 and Figure 3 can further explain the underlying reason: as it is closer to the threshold, the 
index weight and corresponding institutional holdings difference become larger since the index 
weight difference around the threshold becomes even bigger; and as it goes far from the 
threshold, the difference between the two group index weights becomes smaller.   
 
3.2 The institutional investor effect on insider trading 
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In this part, I test the impact on insider trading when there is an exogenous increase in 
institutional ownership. Table 3 shows the two stage least square regression based on equation 
(1) and (2). Panel A represents the results when bandwidth is ±300 while panel B shows the 
results when bandwidth equals ±500. The insider activities are tested on firm level and then 
split into purchase level and sale level. To be more specific, column 1 and column 2 are for 
firm level insider trading. Columns 3 and 4 are based on insider purchase, while columns 5 and 
6 are based on insider sale activity. To explore insider activity, I use the trading frequency and 
trading volume in percent as the measures. Columns 1, 3, 5 are the results for insider trading 
frequency, and columns 2, 4, 6 are for insider trading volume.  
From panel A in which the bandwidth equals ±300, we can find in the first stage regression, 
whether the firm belongs to the Russell 2000 leads to an exogenous increase in institutional 
holdings: top firms in the Russell 2000 on average have 18% more institutional holdings than 
bottom firms in Russell 1000. In the second stage, we can see the increase in institutional 
holding leads to lower trading frequency for insider activity. The magnitude indicates that a 1% 
increase in institutional holding can lead to a 2.36 decrease in trading frequency based on firm 
level. The results indicate that more institutional holdings inhibit insider trading. When insider 
trading is separated into purchase level and sale level, we can see the decrease in insider trading 
frequency is from both purchase and sale: a 1% increase in institutional holding lead to a 0.62 
decrease in insider purchasing and a 1.75 decrease in insider selling. For the effect on trading 
volume, purchase activity plays a more important role: when there is a 1% increase in 
institutional ownership, it leads to a 0.03% decrease in purchase trading volume. For the sale 
trading volume, the effect is not significant.  
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Panel B shows the effect of institutional holdings on insider trading when the bandwidth 
is ±500. We can see regressions in panel B have similar results compared to regressions in 
panel A. The difference between those two sets of regression is: since larger bandwidth includes 
more firms around the cutoff, the difference in institutional holding becomes smaller, and the 
corresponding magnitude of the effect also becomes smaller. In the first stage, firms belonging 
to the Russell 2000 have around 14% more institutional holdings compared to firms in the 
Russell 1000. In the second stage, we can see a 1% increase in institutional ownership leads to 
a 2.34 decrease in trading frequency, and a 0.1% decrease in trading volume. The decrease in 
frequency comes from both purchase level and sale level: a 1% increase in institutional holding 
leads to a 0.43 decrease in insider purchase and a 1.91 decrease in insider selling. Purchase 
activity leads to the decrease in trading volume: 1% increase in institutional holding leads to 
0.03% decrease in insider purchase trading volume in each year.  
Both panels A and B show that institutional holding can lead to a decrease in insider trading 
activity: both frequency and trading volume. For the trading frequency, both purchase level and 
sale level decrease while sale activity is more affected by institutional investors. For the trading 
volume, there is no significant effect on sale trading; institutional holdings have effect only on 
the purchase activity.  
 
4.  Further evidence on the underlying mechanism 
Insiders, who are the managers or directors of the firm, know more information and have better 
interpretations of the firm’s situation compared to outside investors. For institutional investors, 
they have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor and discipline managers to perform 
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in a good manner so that they can decrease the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. If this is the underlying channel, then we should expect that the results should be 
stronger for firms with more severe information asymmetry. In this part, I test whether the 
effects are more dominant in firms with more serious information asymmetry.  
 For firms with more information asymmetry, informed traders possess more information 
and are more willing to profit on it. So, individual investors are more likely to trade with 
informer trader, which hinders their incentive to trade and impede the market efficiency (Cheng, 
Firth, Leung, and Rui 2006; Glosten 1989). That is the reason that firms with severe 
information asymmetry have worse liquidity. I use the stock bid-ask spread to measure the firm 
stock liquidity.  
Bid-ask spread is the ask price minus bid price divided by the stock price. If the market is 
less efficient, dealers would expect they are more likely to trade with informed traders who are 
more likely go gain profits on the trading, so dealers will charge a higher ask price and a lower 
bid price, to compensate for such high-risk transitions. If a firm has higher bid-ask spread, it 
means the information asymmetry is more severe, so insiders are more likely to trade on their 
superior information. Then we should expect an increase in insider activity for firms with 
higher bid-ask spreads. But with the presence of more institutional holding, this effect should 
be mitigated since institutional investors mitigate the information asymmetry. Then we should 
expect the interaction term between institutional holdings and bid-ask spread to be negative, 
which indicates that the presence of institutional investors inhibits insider trading, especially 
for firms with severe information asymmetry.  
I apply the 2SLS regression to test whether institutional investors mitigate the information 
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asymmetry. In the first stage regression, I use equation (1): use whether the firm is belonging 
to Russell 2000 as the instrument for institutional holding. In the second stage, I run the 
regression as following: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂  
                              + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ )   + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡              (3) 
where Spread is the bid-ask spread for each firm. After obtaining the instrumented IO from the 
first stage regression, I interact it with firm spread. In addition, I also put spread as an 
independent variable in the second stage regression. So, if a firm has with more serious 
information asymmetry, there should be more insider trading, and when there are more 
institutional investors, this effect should be mitigated. We should expect that the coefficient for 
the spread itself is positive, and the interaction term is negative.  
 Table 4 presents the results for spread effect. We can see that from the spread coefficient, 
there is a positive significant effect on insider trading: 1% increase in stock spread leads to 0.3 
more insider trading, and most of the effect comes from sale level which accounts for 0.28 of 
the increase. For the interaction term between IO and spread, we can see there is a negative and 
significant effect, which indicates that the presence of institutional investors inhibits insider 
trading, especially for firms with more information asymmetry.  
  To explain the underlying channel for the change in trading volume, I use turnover ratio 
as the measure for market impact concern. To be more specific, I calculate the monthly trading 
volume divided by shares outstanding; then I take the average of that value from current year 
July to next year June. Higher turnover ratio means more shares are traded. If a firm’s turnover 
is high, then it is more likely and easier for insiders to trade on their own information in a large 
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amount, without much concern for the price impact of their trading. So, we should expect 
higher turnover could lead to higher insider trading volume. But with the presence of more 
institutional investors, this effect should be mitigated as institutional investors strengthen 
insiders’ concern of the market impact. I still run the 2SLS, similar to the spread mechanism 
test: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ ∗ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂  
                              + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ )   + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                    (4) 
In the first stage, I still apply equation (1): use Russell 2000 inclusion to instrument 
institutional holdings. In the second stage, I apply the equation (4) as above: after getting the 
instrumented IO, I interact it with turnover, in addition to putting turnover into the regression 
as the independent variable. Then we should expect a positive sign for turnover and a negative 
sign for the interaction term. 
 Table 5 is the results for turnover effect. We can see that higher turnover leads to higher 
trading volume: a 1% increase in institutional holding leads to a 0.03% increase in trading 
volume, and sale activity account for most of the effect. For the interaction term, it is negative 
and significant. So institutional investors inhibit insiders from trading in a large volume by 
strengthening insiders’ concern on market impact.  
 From the results on spread and turnover, we can see that institutional investors inhibit 
insiders trading on their information by mitigating the information asymmetry and 
strengthening the concern on market impact. When the stock spread is high, which means there 
is more severe information asymmetry, insiders tend to trade more frequently. But with the 
existence of more institutional holding, this positive effect is mitigated. From the turnover 
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perspective, for a firm with a high turnover ratio, trading in large amounts is comparatively 
easier compare to trading large amounts in firms with low turnover ratios. That is the reason 
we find higher turnover ratio accompanies higher insider trading volume, but with an increase 
in institutional holdings, this effect is alleviated. From the results above, we can see that 
institutional investors decrease the information asymmetry between insider and outsider; in 
addition, they also strengthen insiders’ concern on the market impact.     
 
5.  Conclusion 
Insider trading attracts much attention from regulators and individual investors since insiders 
have superior information on the firm compared to others. If insiders take advantage of the 
information, then they can extract wealth from uninformed traders and gain profit. By exploring 
the Russell index rebalance, in which there is an exogenous increase in institutional holding, I 
find that institutional investors can inhibit insider trading: both the frequency and trading 
volume. The underlying mechanism is by mitigating information asymmetry between insiders 
and outsiders and strengthening insiders’ concern about the market impact.  
This study offers a potential way for regulators to constrain insider trading, and for 
individual investors to tell whether the insider activity is mitigated, by having a look at the 
proportion of institutional holdings. If there are more institutional investors, on the one hand 
they can mitigate the information asymmetry; on the other hand, they can also restrict insider 
trading by increasing insiders’ concern over the price impact. So, we can see that different from 
the U.K. market, institutional investors in the U.S. play a positive role on insider trading.  
There are some issues waiting for further exploration. For example, why the decrease in 
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insider trading activity is asymmetrically distributed between purchase and sale sides, is there 
another factor related to information asymmetry that can also have a similar effect on insider 
trading. Another question for further study is why U.K. and U.S. institutional investors have 




Figure 1 Russell index market cap  
This figure plots the relation between firm market cap and corresponding rank based on the 
end of May market capitalization. The first 1000 firms go to the Russell 1000 and the 
subsequent 2000 firms go to the Russell 2000. The vertical line corresponds to firm market cap 
at the end of May. Rank in the horizontal line indicates the distance to index threshold. Zero 
means the 1000th rank, which is the threshold of index assignment. Negative numbers are for 







Figure 2 Russell index weight 
This figure plots the relation between firm index weight and its market cap rank around 
threshold. The vertical line is the index weight in percentage and horizontal line is the distance 
to the threshold based on market cap rank. Zero means the 1000th rank, which is the threshold 
of index assignment. Negative numbers are for firms in the Russell 1000, and positive numbers 









Figure 3 Russell index and institutional ownership 
This figure plots the relation between institutional ownership and firm market cap rank around 
the threshold. The vertical line is firm institutional holding in real number and the horizontal 
line is the market cap rank. Rank indicates the distance to threshold. Zero means the 1000th 
rank, which is the threshold of index assignment. Negative numbers are for firms in the Russell 





Table 1 Summary statistics 
This panel reports the summary statistics of firm characteristics for firms in the Russell index. 
The table shows each variable’s mean, standard deviation, 25 percentile value, median, and 75 
percentile value. Variables are defined in the Appendix. All variables are winsorized at 1% 
levels. 
 
 Mean Std. Dev p25 Median p75 
Total IO 60.04% 24.82 41.02% 62.25% 79.71% 
Dedicated 8.31% 8.89 1.77% 6.02% 12.15% 
Quasi indexer 37.25% 17.81 23.97% 37.11% 49.30% 
Transient 14.86% 11.73 6.06% 12.08% 20.97% 
Frequency 45.17 185.72 2.00 13.00 36.00 
Trading volume 1.88% 21.96 0.01% 0.16% 0.81% 
Size 6.99 1.67 5.78 6.83 8.00 
Market to book 3.86 58.15 1.56 2.32 3.82 
ROA 0.13 0.18 0.06 0.13 0.21 






Table 2 Difference in institutional ownership around Russell index threshold 
This table shows the difference in institutional ownership for firms belong to different indexes 
around the index threshold, by regressing on the first stage estimation: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 , 
where Russell2000 is a dummy which indicates whether the firm is included in Russell 2000. 
Table A shows the results when the window size is ±300, and table B represents the results 
when the window size is ±500. Coefficients are reported with t statistics in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in the Appendix.  ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels using two-tailed test.  
 
A. bandwidth is ±300 





Quasi indexer Transient 
ownership 
D 18.39*** 1.49* 10.92*** 6.55*** 
 (11.79) (1.87) (9.88) (8.39) 
Rank -0.03*** -0.004 -0.01** -0.02*** 
 (-4.83) (-0.97) (-2.27) (-6.24) 
Rank*D -0.01** 0.001 -0.02*** 0.001 
 (-2.02) (0.22) (-3.87) (0.48) 
Float adj 0.06*** 0.005 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (11.20) (1.40) (9.36) (10.19) 
N 6317 6243 6316 6315 
 
B. bandwidth is ±500 





Quasi indexer Transient 
ownership 
D 14.25*** 1.03* 9.10*** 4.42*** 
 (12.41) (1.85) (10.65) (7.63) 
Rankm5 -0.02*** -0.002 -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (-5.58) (-1.32) (-2.75) (-5.39) 
Rankm5*D -0.009** 0.0004 -0.007** -0.003* 
 (-2.14) (0.14) (-2.46) (-1.88) 
Float adj 0.05*** 0.004 0.025*** 0.02*** 
 (11.96) (1.22) (9.65) (12.14) 





Table 3 Institutional ownership effects on insider trading: IV estimates 
This table represents the two-stage least square regression based on the equations as below: 
first stage uses whether the firm is belonging to Russell 2000 as an instrument to predict 
institutional ownership: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡,  
The second stage regression uses the predicted IO obtained in first stage to test the effects on 
insider trading behavior: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.  
Dependent variable insider trading is based on firm level. All results are estimated using ranks 
implied by end of May firms’ market capitalization within the assigned index as of the index 
assignment date. Table A shows the results when the window size is ±300, and table B 
represents the results when the window size is ±500. Both stages include year and industry 
fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by firm and reported with t statistics in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in the appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels using the two-tailed test.  
 
A. bandwidth is ±300 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
First stage Institutional Ownership 
Russell2000 18.39*** 18.39*** 18.39*** 18.39*** 18.39*** 18.39*** 
 (11.78) (11.78) (11.78) (11.78) (11.78) (11.78) 
 Firm level Purchase level Sale level 
Second stage frequency volume frequency volume frequency volume 
 -2.36*** -0.11 -0.62** -0.03** -1.75** -0.08 
 (-2.90) (-1.63) (-2.24) (-2.47) (-2.33) (-1.22) 
Rank 0.01 0.001 0.02** 0.001* -0.02 0.0004 
 (0.21) (0.76) (2.07) (1.92) (-0.68) (0.21) 
Rank*R2000 -0.07** -0.002 -0.03 -0.002* -0.05 -0.001 
 (-2.04) (-0.76) (-1.64) (-1.84) (-1.57) (-0.25) 
FloatAdj 0.08*** 0.004* 0.01 0.001 0.07*** 0.003 
 (3.02) (1.81) (1.04) (1.05) (2.99) (1.57) 
Size -10.26 0.135 4.45** 0.09 -14.71** 0.042 
 (-1.57) (0.54) (2.21) (0.85) (-2.43) (0.20) 
MB 0.10 -0.005 0.009 -0.001 0.09 -0.004 
 (0.63) (-1.24) (0.54) (-1.26) (0.58) (-0.89) 
ROA 75.20** 6.92*** 14.01* 0.42 61.19* 6.50*** 
 (2.18) (3.86) (1.67) (1.40) (1.86) (3.72) 
Leverage 0.97 0.33*** -0.21 0.023 1.18 0.30*** 
 (1.13) (2.99) (-0.91) (0.90) (1.57) (2.82) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 




B. bandwidth is ±500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
First stage Institutional Ownership 
Russell2000 14.25*** 14.25*** 14.25*** 14.25*** 14.25*** 14.25*** 
 (12.40) (12.40) (12.40) (12.40) (12.40) (12.40) 
 Firm level Purchase level Sale level 
Second stage frequency volume frequency volume frequency volume 
 -2.34** -0.11** -0.43* -0.03*** -1.91** -0.08 
 (-2.54) (-1.96) (-1.85) (-2.65) (-2.16) (-1.48) 
Rank -0.02 0.002** 0.01* 0.001** -0.03** 0.001* 
 (-1.28) (2.55) (1.88) (2.22) (-2.26) (1.94) 
Rank*R2000 -0.03 -0.003** -0.01 -0.001 -0.02 -0.002* 
 (-1.13) (-2.18) (-1.47) (-1.58) (-0.65) (-1.74) 
FloatAdj 0.08*** 0.003* 0.01 0.001 0.07*** 0.002 
 (2.81) (1.69) (1.00) (1.51) (2.69) (1.27) 
Size -8.97** 0.23 3.11** 0.18* -12.07*** 0.06 
 (-2.32) (1.15) (2.13) (1.91) (-3.49) (0.34) 
MB 0.10 -0.001 0.01 0.000004 0.09 -0.001 
 (1.39) (-0.29) (1.19) (0.01) (1.26) (-0.34) 
ROA 80.29*** 5.79*** 9.04 0.41 71.25*** 5.38*** 
 (3.77) (5.13) (1.36) (1.48) (3.61) (5.03) 
Leverage 0.09 0.20*** -0.18 0.01 0.26 0.19*** 
 (0.12) (2.76) (-1.11) (0.42) (0.41) (2.73) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 





Table 4 Institutional ownership effects on insider trading: spread channel 
This table represents the instrumented variable estimation based on firm stock spread effect. 
The second stage regression shows insider trading variables as a function of institutional 
ownership and its interaction term with firm stock spread: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂  
                              + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ )   + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. 
All results are estimated using ranks implied by end of May firms’ market capitalization within 
the assigned index as of the index assignment date. The window size is ±500. The first two 
columns are for firm level insider trading, the next two columns are for purchase level, and the 
last two columns are for sale level. Both stages include year and industry fixed effect. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined 
in the appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the 
two-tailed test.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Firm level Purchase level Sale level 
 frequency  volume  frequency volume frequency volume 
𝐼?̂? ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 -0.69*** -0.01 -0.04 0.001 -0.65*** -0.007 
 (-3.61) (-0.44) (-1.24) (0.16) (-3.52) (-0.62) 
 -2.40** -0.12** -0.45* -0.03*** -1.95** -0.1 
 (-2.33) (-2.07) (-1.79) (-2.62) (-1.97) (-1.59) 
Spread 0.30*** -0.0003 0.03 0.0003 0.28** -0.0006 
 (2.70) (-0.04) (1.43) (0.09) (2.57) (-0.11) 
Rank -0.01 0.003*** 0.01* 0.001** -0.02 0.002** 
 (-0.71) (2.82) (1.73) (2.06) (-1.58) (2.35) 
Rank*R2000 -0.04 -0.003** -0.02 -0.001 -0.025 -0.003* 
 (-1.41) (-2.24) (-1.43) (-1.47) (-0.98) (-1.88) 
Float Adj 0.09*** 0.003* 0.01 0.001 0.08*** 0.002 
 (2.83) (1.68) (1.05) (1.53) (2.69) (1.25) 
Size -6.65 0.34 3.25** 0.16* -9.90*** 0.17 
 (-1.60) (1.40) (2.02) (1.67) (-2.69) (0.82) 
MB 0.12 -0.003 0.01 -0.001 0.11 -0.003 
 (1.02) (-1.12) (0.68) (-0.75) (0.98) (-0.93) 
ROA 93.69*** 6.50*** 10.12 0.46 83.58*** 6.04*** 
 (4.03) (5.28) (1.37) (1.46) (3.87) (5.20) 
Leverage -0.10 0.22*** -0.21 0.01 0.11 0.21*** 
 (-0.13) (2.77) (-1.11) (0.38) (0.16) (2.76) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 





Table 5 Institutional ownership effects on insider trading: turnover channel 
This table represents the instrumented variable estimation based on firm stock turnover effect. 
The second stage regression shows insider trading variables as a function of institutional 
ownership and its interaction with firm stock turnover: 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂ ∗ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡̂  
                              + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ )   + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. 
All results are estimated using ranks implied by end of May firms’ market capitalization within 
the assigned index as of the index assignment date. The window size is ±500. The first two 
columns are for firm level insider trading, the next two columns are for purchase level, and the 
last two columns are for sale level. Both stages include year and industry fixed effect. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined 
in the Appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using the 
two-tailed test.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Firm level Purchase level Sale level 
 frequency volume frequency volume frequency volume 
𝐼?̂? ∗ 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 0.57** -0.04*** 0.08 -0.003 0.50* -0.03*** 
 (2.14) (-3.94) (1.55) (-0.77) (1.95) (-4.27) 
 -3.19*** -0.11* -0.54* -0.03** -2.65** -0.08 
 (-2.82) (-1.78) (-1.96) (-2.50) (-2.44) (-1.31) 
Turnover -0.99 0.03*** -0.02 0.004 -0.075 0.03*** 
 (-0.63) (3.72) (-0.94) (1.32) (-0.50) (3.60) 
Rank -0.01 0.003*** 0.01* 0.001** -0.02 0.002** 
 (-0.44) (2.99) (1.87) (2.33) (-1.32) (2.37) 
Rank*R2000 -0.04 -0.004** -0.02 -0.001* -0.026 -0.003* 
 (-1.23) (-2.36) (-1.45) (-1.65) (-0.79) (-1.92) 
Float Adj 0.09*** 0.003* 0.01 0.001 0.08** 0.002 
 (2.67) (1.69) (1.02) (1.51) (2.54) (1.26) 
Size -2.49 0.48 3.87** 0.24* -6.36* 0.24 
 (-0.58) (1.61) (2.08) (1.95) (-1.75) (0.92) 
MB 0.11 -0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.10 -0.002 
 (0.90) (-0.88) (0.43) (-0.78) (0.87) (-0.66) 
ROA 106.8*** 7.55*** 11.48 0.71* 95.29*** 6.84*** 
 (4.02) (5.59) (1.37) (1.92) (3.89) (5.40) 
Leverage -0.43 0.20*** -0.23 0.01 -0.20 0.20*** 
 (-0.52) (2.59) (-1.12) (0.25) (-0.27) (2.59) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 






Frequency  The number of transactions happened each year for insider trading. 
Trading volume The proportion of the share traded each year for total insider activities.  
ASSETt Book value of total assets (AT) at the end of fiscal year t; SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of ASSET. 
MBt Market-to-book ratio in fiscal year t, calculated as the market value of 
equity (PRCC_F×CSHO) divided by the book value of equity (CEQ) 
at the end of the year. 
ROAt Return on assets in fiscal year t, calculated as income before 
depreciation and amortization (OIBDP) during year t scaled by total 
assets at the beginning of the year. 
Levt Leverage in fiscal year t, calculated as long-term debt (DLTT) plus 
debt in current liabilities (DLC) scaled by the sum of long-term debt, 
debt in current liabilities, and total shareholders’ equity (SEQ) at the 
end of the year. 
IO Institutional ownership obtained from 13f 
Dedicated  The proportion of dedicated institutional investor based on Bushee 
classification.  
Quasi-indexer The proportion of quasi-indexer institutional investor based on Bushee 
classification. 
Transient The proportion of transient institutional investor based on Bushee 
classification. 
Russell2000   
(R2000) 
 
A dummy indicates whether firm belongs to the Russell 2000. If the 
firm is in Russell 2000, the dummy equals one; if the firm is in Russell 
1000, the dummy equals zero.  
Rank* Firm’s rank based on end of May market capitalization. 
FloatAdj Firm end of May market cap rank minus end of June assigned rank. 
Bid-ask spread Average the monthly bid-ask spread to get annual bid-ask spread for 
each firm.  
Turnover Use number of shares traded divided by total share outstanding to get 
monthly turnover ratio. Then average the monthly turnover to get 
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